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INTRODUCTION

This article examines situations in which the common law doctrine of
necessity justifies violating property rights in order to avert a greater danger
or produce a greater good. There are two broad areas in this topic—private
necessity and public necessity. Private necessity involves the actions of private individuals who destroy, use or consume the property of others, without permission or over their objections.1 Private necessity involves the
need to protect the actor’s own property, that of a third party, or to protect
life and limb of the actor or others.2 The hallmark of private necessity is
that the action is done for the purpose of preserving only the interest of the
actor or some third party, rather than the public at large.3
Public necessity pertains to action taken by public authorities or private
individuals to avert a public calamity.4 The action consists in destroying or
appropriating another’s property.5 The classic example of public necessity
is the destruction of private property to prevent the spread of fire6 or disease,7 and hence to avert an injury to the public at large. Public necessity is
in operation where the police trespass on or damage private property in
order to apprehend a criminal suspect or gain access to the site of an emergency.8 The principle behind public necessity is that the law regards the
welfare of the public as superior to the interests of individuals and, when
there is a conflict between them, the latter must give way.9
Glanville Williams expressed the necessity doctrine in the following
way: “[S]ome acts that would otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a

1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (8th ed. 2004) (defining private necessity); see also
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Company, 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (discussed in Part
II.A infra).
2. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 197 (1965) (Private Necessity).
3. Id.
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (8th ed. 2004) (defining public necessity); see also
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (Cal. 1853) (discussed in Part III.D infra).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 204 (Entry to Arrest for Criminal Offense)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (Public Necessity).
6. See, e.g., Surocco, 3 Cal. at 71; Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35, 35 (1850); Field v. City of
Des Moines, 39 Ia. 575, 575 (1874); Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J. L. 714, 714 (N.J. 1848); Keller v.
City of Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614, 614 (1879). See generally Joseph H. Beale, Note,
Justification for Injury, 41 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1928).
7. Seavy v. Preble, 64 Me. l20 (l874).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that necessity
is “a utilitarian defense” based on “maximizing social welfare . . . where the social benefits of the
crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the crime”); see also David L. Shapiro, The
Case of the Speluncean Exploreers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834,
1914 (1999) (“Like all of the lesser-evil justifications, necessity is openly utilitarian.”).
9. See City of Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 54 S.E. 453, 464 (1906).
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good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils.”10
Williams offers this example:
Suppose that a dike threatens to give way, and the actor is faced
with the choice of either making a breach in the dike, which he
knows will result in one or two people being drowned, or doing
nothing, in which case he knows that the dike will burst at another
point involving a whole town in sudden destruction. In such a situation, where there is an unhappy choice between the destruction
of one life and the destruction of many, utilitarian philosophy
would certainly justify the actor in preferring the lesser evil.11
Another commentator observed:
[T]hese [justified] acts are ones, as regard which, upon balancing
all considerations of public policy, it seems desirable that they
should be encouraged and commended even though in each case
some individual may be injured or the result may be otherwise not
wholly to be desired.12
The necessity doctrine “represents a concession to human weakness in
cases of extreme pressure, where the accused breaks the law rather than
submitting to the probability of greater harm if he does not break the law.” 13
English and American courts have long recognized necessity as a common
law principle, even in the absence of statutory law on the subject.14 Today
many states have enacted varying forms of a statutory necessity defense.15
With the necessity defense there will always be a prima facie violation
of the law. For purposes of this article, the violation will consist of trespass, conversion or other kinds of infringement of property rights. Under
the necessity doctrine, there is a weighing of interests: the act of invasion of
another’s property is justified under the necessity doctrine only if done to
protect or advance some private or public interest of a value greater than, or
at least equal to, that of the interest invaded. The policy rationale is that

10. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 (Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1957).
11. Id. at 190-200.
12. JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 189 (West Publishing Co. 1934).
13. A. J. Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability, 91 L. Q. REV. 102, 106 (1975).
14. Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law:
The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 291-96 (1974).
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 (LexisNexis 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463
(2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302 (LexisNexis 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030
(LexisNexis 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West
2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2004); TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22 (Vernon 2004);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 2003).
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society as a whole has no interest in the invasion of property rights unless
the good which is intended to result is greater than, or at least equal to, the
harm that it is likely to cause.
A major issue associated with both private and public necessity is
whether compensation is owed to the aggrieved party whose property is
damaged, appropriated or destroyed. In cases involving both private and
public necessity, there is no liability for the technical tort, be it trespass or
conversion. However, in cases of private necessity, for the most part actors
are considered to have an “incomplete” or “partial” privilege so that the
aggrieved party is entitled to compensation for the damage done. With regard to public necessity, the general rule is that no compensation is owed,
but there are numerous exceptions.
This article first examines private necessity, and a variety of situations
in which actors have trespassed on land or committed acts of conversion in
necessitous circumstances are considered. Among other things, situations
involving the loss of control of automobiles, the special situation of aviation
emergency landings, and acts in diverting harm from the actor to a third
party are discussed. The larger part of the article focuses on public necessity, especially cases involving trespass or conversion on the part of the
military in time of war. Then the focus turns to other instances of the invasion of property rights based on public necessity, including emergencies
such as preventing a fire from spreading, preventing the spread of disease,
and actions by the police in apprehending criminal suspects. The issue of
whether aggrieved parties are legally entitled to compensation will be
considered throughout the article.
II. VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS BASED ON PRIVATE
NECESSITY
A. TRESPASS TO PREVENT SERIOUS HARM TO ONESELF, ONE’S
LAND, THIRD PARTIES, OR ONE ’S CHATTELS
There is a general sense in the doctrine of necessity that one has the
qualified privilege to intentionally trespass onto the land of another in order
to prevent serious harm to oneself, to one’s own land, to one’s chattels, or
to the person, land, or chattels of another. However, compensation must
ordinarily be paid for any harm done in the process.
No one would have any qualms about justifying the action of the
proverbial backpacker who, in the stress of weather and being lost in the
wilderness, comes upon an unoccupied cabin, enters it, and partakes of
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foodstuff and shelter.16 It seems intuitive, as well, that the backpacker
should be required to compensate the occupant for the food so consumed.
All the more so, if the backpacker was reckless in getting stranded or in
failing to take provisions that would probably be associated with a
backpacking venture. This principle is set forth in section 197 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Private Necessity):
(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession
of another if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent
serious harm to:
(a) the actor, or his land or chattels, or
(b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either,
unless the actor knows or has reason to know that the one for
whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such
action.
(2) Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person,
he is subject to liability for any harm done in the exercise of the
privilege stated in Subsection (1) to any legally protected interest
of the possessor in the land or connected with it, except where the
threat of harm to avert which the entry is made is caused by the
tortious conduct or contributory negligence of the possessor.17
The Comment to this section states that when necessary to prevent
serious harm, a person is privileged “to break and enter or to destroy a fence
or other enclosure and indeed a building, including a dwelling.”18 However, “more may be required to justify [entering a dwelling] than . . . entry
upon other premises”19 and this is “a fact to be taken into account in
determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s action[s].”20 Thus, one
might be justified in breaking into someone’s barn under a set of circumstances that would fail to justify breaking into the dwelling. The Comment
also states: “[I]t may be reasonable for the actor to break through a fence in
order to rescue his dog who is drowning in the plaintiff’s pond, where it
would not be reasonable for him to break into the plaintiff’s dwelling in
order to release the same dog from temporary confinement.”21
16. See Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 93, 97 (1978) (discussing the connection between the right to life and human wellbeing).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 197 (1965).
18. Id. cmt. g.
19. Id. cmt. h.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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What if, in the backpacker case, the cabin reasonably appears
unoccupied but in fact is actually occupied? What if the occupant objects to
the intrusion? Does the backpacker have a right, based in necessity, to use
reasonable force to gain entry and to take food from the cabin, over the
objection of the occupant? The Restatement addresses this concern as
follows: “[T]he privilege . . . carries with it the subsidiary privilege to use
reasonable force to the person of the possessor or any third person.”22
However, “[d]irect authority is lacking as to the subsidiary privilege to use
force against the person, or to break or enter an enclosure or a building. . .
[but that] to render the privilege of entry effective the subsidiary privilege is
obviously necessary.”23 In an emergency one might well use force against
an objecting possessor, and worry about the consequences later. For
instance, if my dog is drowning in a neighbor’s pool, I would likely run
down the side of my neighbor’s house towards the backyard, and then jump
over the fence to save my dog. If, as it happens, my neighbor blocks my
passage (perhaps the neighbor is unaware of the nature of the emergency
and there is no time to explain), I will likely use reasonable force to push
past the occupant, and explain later. If I were charged with trespass and
assault and battery, the Restatement view would justify the action based on
the necessity doctrine. I would, however, be liable to pay for damages
associated with the trespass, such as costs to replace or repair a broken
fence, or damages to my neighbor’s flowerbed. It would also seem consistent with the Restatement position to impose liability for any damages
associated with the assault, such as medical costs.
In Rossi v. Del Duca,24 the plaintiff, a child, was walking home from
school, when a large dog chased her down the street.25 In order to protect
herself from harm, she cut across a field to the rear of the defendant’s house
in an effort to escape from the dog chasing her and to get home.26 However, another dog, owned by the defendant, proceeded to attack and injured
her.27 The girl sued for damages under a Massachusetts law that imposed
strict liability on the owner or keeper of any dog that does damage to the
body or property of any person.28 The statute made an exception for instances where a person at the time such damage was sustained, committed a

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. cmt. g.
Id. Reporter’s notes to § 197 cmt. g.
81 N.E.2d 591 (Mass. 1962).
Rossi, 81 N.E.2d at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593 (internal citation omitted).
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trespass.29 The evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff was trespassing
on defendant’s property when the dog attacked her.30 However, the court,
citing section 197 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, held that the plaintiff
had a privilege to enter the land because it reasonably appeared to be necessary to prevent serious harm from occurring to her.31 “This privilege not
only relieves the intruder from liability for technical trespass but it also
destroys the possessor’s immunity from liability in resisting the intrusion.”32 Thus, the court noted that this privilege to enter the land means
that the possessor of the land is under a duty to permit that person to come
onto and remain there, and is not privileged to block the actor from
proceeding with the necessitous conduct.33
In Depue v. Flateu,34 the plaintiff was invited into the defendant’s
house, and while there, he was taken suddenly ill and fell to the floor.35 He
requested permission to remain overnight, but defendants refused.36 The
defendants assisted him from their house to the cutter.37 Plaintiff could not
hold the reins to guide his team, and one of the defendants threw the reins
over his shoulders, and started the team upon the road.38
The plaintiff, who nearly froze to death, sued for damages. The court
noted that the plaintiff was in the defendants’ house by invitation.39 He was
temporarily their guest.40 The court issued a ruling noting the
comprehensive principle that whenever a person is placed in such
a position with regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does
not use due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 593-94. The court quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 197, comment k
(Tent. draft no. 2, 1958), on this point:
The important difference between the status of one who is a trespasser on land and one
who is on the land pursuant to an incomplete privilege is that the latter is entitled to be
on the land and therefore the possessor of the land is under a duty to permit him to
come and remain there and hence is not privileged to resist.
Id.
33. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts take the view that the possessor of land
or chattel has no right to use reasonable force to defend his exclusive possession, in cases of
necessity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263, cmt. b (1965).
34. 111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907).
35. Depue, 111 N.W. at 1.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id.
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person, the duty at once arises to exercise care commensurate with
the situation in which he thus finds himself.41
The defendants thus violated a legal duty towards their guest when they
turned him out of their house in a winter night and left him to his fate.42
Illustration 4 to section 197 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, echoes
the Depue case:
On a very cold winter night A, visiting at B’s dwelling, is overcome by an attack of illness which leaves him helpless and unable
to take care of himself. A is privileged without liability to remain
in B’s house until arrangements can be made to take him to a place
where he will not be exposed to danger from the weather.43
In Currie v. Silvernale,44 the defendant made unauthorized entry upon
plaintiff’s land, claiming necessity in an emergency to save his own property.45 The plaintiff sued for trespass and for injunctive relief to prevent
further trespasses.46 The defendant claimed that he entered the plaintiff’s
land so as to block the formation of a channel that would have prevented
water from flowing into defendant’s millpond, and would have thus

41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 3. Of similar import, see Texas Midland R. R. Co. v. Geraldon, 117 S.W. 1004,
1007-08 (Tex. 1909), in which the court held that the inconvenience in keeping a railway station
open was not sufficient to justify turning out into a storm, far from any shelter, a woman who had
missed her train and was waiting out the storm in the waiting room until the next train left the
following morning.
According to Bohlen:
It is clear that a railway company may not eject even a “hobo,” stealing a ride on its
through express, while the train is going at fifty miles an hour, although this involves a
toleration of his presence on the train until it reaches the next stop; and a captain of a
vessel is not privileged to make a stowaway, discovered in mid-ocean, walk the plank,
although he would be privileged to force him to leave the vessel by the same plank if it
were a gangway to a dock.
Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property
and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307, 311 n.7 (1926).
Of similar import, see Bradshaw v. Frazier, 85 N.W. 752 (Ia. 1901), in which the court held
that a judgment of eviction to oust a holdover tenant “could not be lawfully executed if a member
of the tenant’s family was so ill that his removal would endanger his life.” Bohlen, supra note 42,
at 311. This is subject, however, to the proviso that his continued presence is not likely to cause
the occupiers of other premises in the building to acquiring a contagious disease. Id.
A similar holding occurred in Tucker v. Burt, 115 N.W. 722 (Mich. 1908), in which a janitor
who was entitled to occupy an apartment during his employment, was discharged. Id. It was held
that a member of his family, who was ill with a contagious disease and whose removal was
dangerous, could be removed if the interest of the occupiers of the other premises in their bodily
security outweighed the janitor’s family member’s interests. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, illus. 4 (1965).
44. 171 N.W. 782 (Minn. 1919).
45. Currie, 171 N.W. at 784.
46. Id.
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destroyed the usefulness of defendant’s dam.47 The defendant constructed
an embankment on plaintiff’s land with rocks and dirt so as to prevent overflow from forming new channels.48 It was the defendant’s purpose to maintain the natural spillway so that the efficiency of defendant’s dam would not
become impaired.49
The court noted that an unauthorized entry upon the lands of another to
save private property may be justified in an emergency.50 The court said
that it may well be that the “unexpected opening of a new channel” was
such an emergency that threatened the destruction of the defendant’s water
power, and that this could justify entering plaintiff’s property to preserve
the water flow.51 This entry not only saved the defendant’s water flow, but
also averted the erosion to plaintiff’s property, and thus was beneficial to
both parties.52 However, the facts of the case indicated that following the
initial trespass, the defendant made repeated entries onto plaintiff’s land to
make repairs.53 The court concluded that these repeated entries must be regarded as trespass or a wrongful invasion of plaintiff’s premises, but that
the appropriate remedy would be nominal damages and an injunction forbidding further trespasses.54
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.55 is a classic tort case decided
in 1910 by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The case was somewhat of a
cause celebre in its day and generated critical comments in several law
review articles.56 The facts of the case are as follows: A ship’s captain kept
his vessel, the steamship Reynolds, moored to a dock after its cargo had
been offloaded rather than risk losing the ship in a very severe storm.57 The
storm developed during the unloading process, and by the time the unloading was completed, winds were at fifty miles per hour.58 The storm
continued to increase in intensity as the night went on.59 The captain tried
to get a tug to tow the ship from the dock, but no tug could be obtained
47. Id. at 783.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 784.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
56. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 157 (1973);
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 546 (1972);
George P. Fletcher,The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory, 2 L. & PHIL. 63, 65 (1983).
57. Vincent, 124 N.W. at 221.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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because of the storm.60 Those in charge of the vessel were therefore confronted with the following choice of evils: either keep the vessel moored
fast to the dock with the obvious certainty of injuring the dock, or permit
the boat to drift away into a tempest in circumstances that would in all
probability render the boat unmanageable.61 The captain opted to keep the
lines fastened to the dock, and “as soon as one parted or chafed it was
replaced, sometimes with a larger one.”62 The winds and waves struck the
Reynolds with such force “that she was constantly being lifted and thrown
against the dock,” causing damage that the jury found in the amount of
$500.63
The Minnesota Supreme Court held the master was justified in keeping
his ship tied to the dock during the storm.64 The court commented that it
would have been highly imprudent for the captain to attempt to leave the
dock or to have permitted his vessel to drift away from it.65 The court
added that while “the situation was one in which the ordinary rules
regulating property rights were suspended by forces beyond human
control,”
those in charge of the vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts
held her in such a position that the damage to the dock resulted,
and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, it
seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to
the extent of the injury inflicted.66
The court also stated:
Theologians hold that a starving man may, without moral guilt,
take what is necessary to sustain life; but it could hardly be said
that the obligation would not be upon such a person to pay the
value of the property so taken when he became able to do so. And
so public necessity, in times of war or peace, may require the
taking of private property for public purposes; but under our
system of jurisprudence compensation must be made.67

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
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Finally, the court concluded:
This is not a case where life or property was menaced by any
object or thing belonging to the plaintiff, the destruction of which
became necessary to prevent the threatened disaster, nor is it a case
where, because of the act of God, or unavoidable accident, the
infliction of the injury was beyond the control of the defendant,
but is one where the defendant prudently and advisedly availed
itself of the plaintiff’s property for the purpose of preserving its
own more valuable property. . . .68
The court cited with approval Ploof v. Putnam,69 in which a Vermont
court held the owner of a dock liable for damages to a shipowner for unmooring a vessel that had sought refuge in a storm, thereby casting it back
into the storm.70 The plaintiff in Ploof was sailing with his family in his
sloop upon Lake Champlain, and was overtaken by a violent tempest which
threatened to swamp his boat.71 The plaintiff was faced with the following
choice of evils: either to trespass by mooring the boat to a private dock
owned by the defendant, without permission, and thereby prevent destruction of his boat and of the lives of its occupants; or to remain upon the lake
in the midst of the storm. The plaintiff decided to trespass on the private
dock, and secured it with mooring.72 However, the defendant’s employee
promptly unmoored the vessel, which was cast upon the opposite shore by
the tempest, with the result that “the sloop and its contents were thereby
destroyed, and the plaintiff and his wife and children [were] cast into the
lake and upon the shore, receiving injuries.”73 The complaint charged the
defendant alternatively with trespass and negligence.74 The plaintiff argued
that it was the duty of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to moor his sloop
to the dock and to permit it to remain so moored during the continuance of
the storm.75 The court held for the plaintiff, finding the defendant responsible for damages because his employee unmoored the vessel, permitting it
to drift upon the shore, with resultant injuries to it.76
The Vincent court commented that in the Ploof case, if “the vessel had
been permitted to remain, and the dock had suffered an injury, we believe

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
Ploof, 71 A. at 188-89.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 190.
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the shipowner would have been held liable for the injury done.”77 The
Vincent case holds for the idea that a shipowner can unilaterally appropriate
a dock in necessitous circumstances, provided he pays for its damages. In
other words, there is a “qualified” necessity in that the action, while justified under the necessity doctrine, nonetheless entails paying compensation
for damages occasioned by the trespass.78
The Vincent court tried to distinguish the facts of its case from injuries
to a dock caused by an act of God, which would not result in liability for
damages.79 The court concluded:
[H]ad the ship entered the harbor, and while there had become
disabled and been thrown against the plaintiffs’ dock, the plaintiffs
could not have recovered. Again, if while attempting to hold fast
to the dock the lines had parted, without any negligence, and the
vessel carried against some other boat or dock in the harbor, there
would be no liability upon her owner.80
While the storm, in itself, was an act of God, the damage to the dock
was not. That is, the Vincent court seemed to focus on the fact that the
cables attached from the boat to the dock had given way, and that the
master of the ship reattached new cables to keep the boat from being cast
adrift. The opinion seems to rest on the fact that the master reattached the
ship, using stronger cables, after the initial mooring got dislodged during
the storm. This reconfiguring the moorings with the stronger cables dissociated the incident from being an act of God. The master had the right to
renew his cables, but in doing so he was required to compensate the dock
owner for the damages.81
The Vincent case suggests that if the ship had not completed discharging her cargo, so that her license to use the dock had still been in
effect, or if the captain had not reattached the vessel to the dock with fresh
cables after her moorings broke, the case might be decided as one of an act
of God, and no liability would have been imposed.
The dissenting judge in Vincent declared:
[I]f the boat was lawfully in position at the time the storm broke,
and the master could not, in the exercise of due care, have left that
position without subjecting his vessel to the hazards of the storm,
then the damage to the dock, caused by the pounding of the boat,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 222.
See id. (explaining that damages from necessity can be compensated).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was the result of an inevitable accident. If the master was in the
exercise of due care, he was not at fault. The reasoning of the
opinion admits that if the ropes, or cables, first attached to the
dock had not parted, or if, in the first instance, the master had used
the stronger cables, there would be no liability.82
The dissent seems to make sense. The majority noted that, often
enough, if property is damaged in consequence of an act of God, one who
benefits from that damage or destruction is not legally obligated to pay
compensation.83 It seems to be a superficial distinction to say that had the
captain’s cables held fast, the consequential damage would have been an
unavoidable accident due to an act of God, whereas by retying the vessel
with stronger cables, the ensuing damage was not an act of God and
therefore liability attaches.
The dissent also analyzed the case in terms of contract law. He
emphasized that the defendant was “lawfully in position” at the dock, and
that “one who constructs a dock to the navigable line of waters and enters
into contractual relations with the owner of a vessel to moor at the same,
takes the risk of damage to his dock by a boat caught there by a storm” if
the damage “could not have been avoided in the exercise of due care.”84
One commentator of the Vincent case, Robert Keeton, suggests that a
basis for liability in the case hinges on the moral sense of the community.85
According to Keeton, the case was one of “conditional privilege,” under
which one could “use the property of another in circumstances of private
necessity” if one “compensate[d] for any harm done.”86 Another view is
that Vincent is an example of an appropriate application of “strict liability,”
one that “reduce[s] the administrative costs of decision” by relieving the
court of the necessity to use cost-benefit analysis, leaving that analysis “in
private hands where it belongs.”87
Yet another commentator opines that the decision creates “a noncategory tort, grounded in social mores, which requires compensation from a
party that used its temporal power to protect its interests, with substantial
certainty of injury to another, in a situation about which the parties had not
engaged in prior bargaining.”88 One final view is that Vincent “is not an

82.
83.
84.
85.
(1959).
86.
87.
88.

Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Robert Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 428
Id.
Epstein, supra note 56, at 188.
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instance of the exercise of a privilege at all.”89 Rather, “[i]t is simply a case
of intentionally damaging the property of another in the civil sense of
‘intention,’ that is, of engaging in conduct that one knows, with substantial
certainty, will lead to that result.”90 This would be “[a]t the very least, . . .
negligent or reckless behavior” and the commentator concludes that it is not
at all surprising that the defendant must pay compensation.91
The principle of the Vincent case is embodied in section 197 of the
Restatement Second of Torts, illustration 2:
A moors his boat to B’s wharf and there discharges its cargo,
whereupon it is his duty to vacate the wharf. A violent storm then
arises, and A, to prevent his boat from being washed ashore and
wrecked, strengthens and renews the cables by which his boat is
lashed to B’s wharf. The force of the storm causes the boat to
damage the wharf. A is privileged to keep his boat at B’s wharf,
but . . . he is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused to the
wharf.92
A modern case from England involved trespass with respect to jettison
of oil during a storm at sea, justified by the necessity doctrine. The case,
Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp.,93 involved a claim in trespass, nuisance and negligence, for damages incurred to clean up plaintiff’s property
after a tanker in difficulty discharged oil to prevent “breaking her back,” 94
which would have endangered the ship, her cargo, and the lives of the
crew.95
While at sea, a problem suddenly developed in the operations of the
vessel’s steering mechanism.96 The weather at the time made it impossible
to drop anchor, and it appeared reasonably clear that any effort to turn the
ship around was more dangerous than to continue on course towards the
coast.97 The master recognized there was danger in proceeding into what
was a narrow channel with defective steering gear, but he considered that
the lesser of the two evils was to attempt to get away from the storm and
into sheltered water, rather than put back to sea.98 He was concerned that
89. George Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points
of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 1002 (1999).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1002-03.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, illus. 2 (1965).
93. [1956] A.C. 218 (H.L).
94. Id. at 220.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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the lives of people on board could be jeopardized if he turned the ship
around and proceeded back out to sea. The master began to discharge the
oil tanks in order to lighten the ship, and over four hundred tons of oil were
released.99 The ship became stranded.100 The oil deposited on the plaintiff’s foreshore, and extended for about seven and one-half miles.101 The
people on board, however, were safe and the ship eventually was towed.
The plaintiff argued that there was trespass from the bare fact that oil
was discharged onto the plaintiff’s property. In addition, the plaintiff alleged negligent navigation resulting in the jettison of oil and stranding of
the ship. The master explained that the stranding was due to a defect in the
steering, and was not due to negligence. Principally, the defendant argued
on the defense of necessity—that in discharging the oil, the master “was
doing no more than was reasonably necessary for the safety of the crew and
of the ship and cargo.”102
The trial judge stated that “[t]he safety of human lives belongs to a different scale of values from the safety of property. The two are beyond comparison and the necessity for saving life has at all times been considered a
proper ground for inflicting such damage as may be necessary on another’s
property.”103 The judge found that there was no negligence in the action
taken in response to the sudden defect in the steering mechanism.104
Accepting the trial judge’s finding that there was no negligence, the House
of Lords affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that there was no liability on
the part of the tanker’s owners.105
With respect to the defense of necessity, the court stated:
I am not prepared to hold without further consideration that a man
is entitled to damage the property of another without compensating
him merely because the infliction of such damage is necessary in
order to save his own property. I doubt whether the court in such
circumstances can be asked to evaluate the relation of the damage
done to the property saved, by inquiring, for example, whether it is
permissible to do £5,000 worth of damage to a third party in order
to save property worth £10,000. In the ordinary case of jettison
the property which is sacrificed is the property of a person who is

99. Id. at 220-21.
100. Id. at 221.
101. Southport Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co., (1953) 3 W.L.R. 773 (Q.B.).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 779.
104. Id.
105. Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp., [1956] A.C. 218 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.
C.A.).
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interested in the venture, and an equitable adjustment is made by
the application of general average. The same considerations may
not apply to the property of a third party who has no stake in the
venture which is being saved.106
The court noted, however, that the imminent danger was not only to the
ship, but that the lives of the crew were endangered as well.107
The House of Lords noted that in the necessity doctrine, if the exigent
circumstances are occasioned by the actor’s negligence, the defense would
not be available.108 However, the evidence was inconclusive as to what
caused the defect in the steering gear.109 The court held that there was no
negligence proven on the part of the master with respect to any defect in his
ship, and that based on the necessity doctrine in the context of saving lives
there would be no liability for the damages to plaintiff’s property caused by
the jettison of oil from the tanker.110 The case stands thus for the proposition that property may be destroyed when necessary to save human life,
and that no compensation is payable if the person who destroys the property
has not been at fault in creating the life-threatening danger.
B. TRESPASS TO RECOVER LIVESTOCK
As noted in Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
necessity doctrine may justify trespass onto another’s property in order to
prevent serious harm to livestock (i.e., chattel) that have wandered there.111
In addition, sections 100-106 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth
principles by which one is entitled to use force against another for the sole
purpose of recovering chattel.112
Arlowski v. Foglio113 dealt with this issue. The plaintiffs and defendant
owned farms that were contiguous to each other.114 Some of the fencing for
which plaintiffs were responsible was inadequate.115 Several of defendant’s
cattle roamed onto plaintiffs’ land.116 The plaintiffs, husband and wife,
took possession of the cattle and locked them in their barn.117 The
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Southport, [1953] 3 W.L.R. at 778.
Id. at 779.
[1956] A.C. at 228.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 232.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 197 (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 100-106 (1965).
135 A. 397 (Conn. 1926).
Arlowski, 135 A. at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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defendant came over and demanded the return of his cattle.118 This request
was refused, and the husband threatened to kill him unless he departed.119
Later, the defendant returned to again try and retrieve his cattle because he
feared the cattle would be hungry and thirsty.120 He had tried to get the
help of local selectmen, but no one was available to come to his aid.121 He
carried a pistol because he wanted to defend himself, if necessary, against a
vicious dog kept by the plaintiffs.122 Indeed, he was attacked by the dog
and shot the dog, wounding but not killing it.123 Then, the plaintiffs set
upon to severely beat the defendant; the defendant in turn fought back and
ended up injuring the wife.124 Later, selectmen retrieved the cows and returned them to the defendant.125 Both parties ended up suing each other for
assault and battery.126
According to Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
defendant would not be liable for any harm done in the exercise of the privilege to enter given the plaintiff’s negligence in bringing about the situation
that necessitated the entry. The court held that the plaintiffs were not in
lawful possession of the livestock since the livestock’s incursion onto the
land, was caused by their defective division fence.127 Also, the court found
that the defendant’s entry to retrieve his livestock, which the plaintiffs had
wrongfully retained, was lawful.128 It was proper for the defendant to take
such precautions to known dangers involved in such entry as a reasonable
person would deem proper, including a gun to protect himself against the
vicious dog.129 The defendant was awarded damages on his crosscomplaint.130
C. TRESPASS TO AVOID AN OBSTRUCTION ON PUBLIC HIGHWAYS
There are numerous instances of trivial entry on another’s property due
to obstructions on public roads. For example, on many country roads where
there are no sidewalks, it is frequently necessary to walk across the edge of
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someone’s lawn to avoid oncoming traffic or to avoid a puddle, and such
intrusions are considered justifiable trespass.131 Or, if a public highway is
obstructed, one may go around the obstruction, trespassing on private land
for that purpose. According to Section 195 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, if a flood or fallen tree renders a road impassable, one is “privileged . . . to enter . . . upon neighboring land in possession of another.”132
In such cases the actor is liable to pay for any harm his entry might cause.
The Restatement view appears to have had its progeny in the 1851
case, Campbell v. Race,133 in which the defendant was sued for trespass to
plaintiff’s property. The defendant argued that he had a right of way based
in necessity, because the public highway adjacent to plaintiff’s property was
impassable due to snowdrifts.134 The defendant went over the adjoining
fields of the plaintiff, doing no unnecessary damage, and then returned to
the highway at the point where it was passable.135
The plaintiff argued that the necessity doctrine is limited, in cases of
trespass, to situations of “inevitable necessity or accident,” neither of which
existed in this case.136 The judge disagreed, and stated what he considered
was a well-settled rule:
If a traveller in a highway, by unexpected and unforeseen occurrences, such as a sudden flood, heavy drifts of snow, or the falling
of a tree, is shut out from the travelled paths, so that he cannot
reach his destination, without passing upon adjacent lands, he is
certainly under a necessity so to do. . . . Serious inconveniences,
to say the least, would follow, especially in a climate like our own,
if this right were denied to those who have occasion to pass over
the public way. Not only would intercourse and business be sometimes suspended, but life itself would be endangered. . . . Such a
temporary and unavoidable use of private property, must be
regarded as one of those incidental burdens to which all property
in a civilized community is subject. . . . It is a maxim of the
common law, that where public convenience and necessity come
in conflict with private right, the latter must yield to the former.137

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Christie, supra note 89 at 997 n. 25.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 195(1) (1965).
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The court also noted that, had another way been available to proceed
beyond the obstruction without trespassing on plaintiff’s land, the defendant
should have selected that alternative.138
D. REMOVING, DISMANTLING OR DESTROYING OBSTRUCTIONS TO
NAVIGATION
In some instances, property owners engage in the destruction of property in order to preserve their right of passage through navigable waters.
For example, McKeesport Sawmill Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.139 was an action
for damages for the destruction of a coal barge.140 The barge had slipped its
moorings and was carried downstream where it got stuck in a great chunk
of slush ice and obstructed a bridge owned by the defendant railroad.141
The barge remained stuck there for several days, and the owner did nothing
to rescue it or get it out of the way.142 The defendants dislodged the barge,
finding it necessary as a last resort to break up the barge in order to effect
its removal.143 The defendants’ workers cut the barge to pieces only after
other means had been tried and failed in efforts to remove it.144
The plaintiff introduced evidence that impressed the jury with the idea
that the barge could have been saved by first breaking up the ice with a
steamboat, and then attaching a line to pull the barge away.145 The judge
instructed the jury that the defendants should be held to a standard in which
they did as little injury as possible to the barge, and that, if they did not, the
defendants would be liable.146 The jury found for the plaintiff.147
In reversing and ordering a new trial, the court of appeals noted that in
exercising the right to remove an obstruction in navigable waters, the exigencies are such that one need not be held to the standard of ordinary care;
one needs to simply avoid gross negligence or recklessness.148 The action
in removing the obstruction must be assessed in light of the exigencies of
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the situation.149 One does not have to try and save the obstructing property,
“but simply not to recklessly or unnecessarily injure or destroy it.”150
The court noted that the barge
was a derelect, brought down upon them by the high water, and
whether it got loose through the neglect of the owner to properly
moor it or not is not material. It was astray, without a master, and
thereby became a floating nuisance, which they were entitled to
ward off or get out of the way as best they could.151
The court added:
[W]hile they could not wantonly or unnecessarily destroy it, they
were not required to save it for an unknown owner, or have particular regard to interests, which he himself took no pains to assert.
To hold, therefore, that care should have been taken to do the least
possible injury in the removal of the barge, was going farther than
was warranted. The defendants were authorized to take such steps
as were reasonably necessary to free themselves from the danger,
which is quite different.152
In addition, the court noted that the defendants had urged the plaintiff to
remove the obstruction, but nothing happened, so that the defendants had no
reasonable legal alternative but to take action on their own.153
Thus, the general rule is that if one’s approach in navigable waters is
obstructed, by accident or otherwise, one has the right to remove the obstruction in a manner that is consistent with the exigencies of the case,
taking care not to act in a grossly negligent or wanton manner in removing
it.154 Of course, one must first pursue a reasonable legal alternative, such as
getting the owner of the obstruction to take appropriate action, assuming
that the danger posed by the obstruction is not imminent.155
In Philiber v. Matson, 156 the same standard of conduct in extricating an
obstruction was discussed. The plaintiff’s raft, while floating down a navigable highway, got stuck.157 The defendant, coming upon the scene in
another raft, tried to avoid colliding with plaintiffs’ raft and got thrown to
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one side and stuck on the shore.158 Then a third raft came down and
jammed between the two.159 At that point, there was danger that other rafts
would become entangled because the stream was crowded with rafts.160
The defendant thereupon cut away so much of the plaintiffs’ raft as would
enable him to get his own raft loose.161 The court held that this was an
emergency situation and that the defendant had a right to extricate his raft in
the only way he could—to cut it loose—provided he did no more than was
necessary to free his raft.162 “If, on the other hand, it was not necessary to
cut plaintiffs’ raft for that purpose, but the act was wanton and uncalled for,
or more injury was done than the circumstances required,” the defendant
would be liable for damages.163
In Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co.,164 the court considered a situation
involving a span of bridge that had become dislodged in a storm and
obstructed property of the defendant.165 In March 1846, a span of a bridge
was swept away by a flood in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and lodged on the
end of an island owned by the defendant.166 The portion of the bridge
caused damage to the defendant’s property.167 It diverted a stream, caused
soil to be washed away, destroyed crops, and interfered with livestock
pastures.168 The defendant asked the president of the bridge company to
remove the span of bridge that had lodged on his property, but the company
failed to take action.169 After several months, the defendant hired help to
dismantle and remove the obstruction and piled it up near his barn.170 He
used some of the timber dismantled from the bridge to erect other
buildings.171
The court concluded that no one was at fault for the initial obstruction
of the span of bridge because it was an unavoidable accident.172 Thus, the
bridge company would not be liable for damages to the owner of the land
where the span of bridge came to rest. The court found that the plaintiff
158.
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would have been justified in entering the land of the defendant without
asking permission, in order to remove the span of bridge.173 The refusal of
the company to remove it did not divest them of the property or bar them
from reclaiming it; that is, the span of bridge remained the property of the
plaintiff while lodged on defendant’s property.174
The court found that the defendant was justified in dismantling and
removing the obstruction, but that he was liable for damages to the extent
that he appropriated the wooden assemblage for his own use.175 The court
also concluded that the defendant was not entitled to compensation for costs
incurred in dismantling the bridge and removing it.176
E.

TRESPASS—UNINTENTIONAL AND NON-NEGLIGENT ENTRY ONTO
ANOTHER’S LAND

There are numerous situations that can arise, predicated on a kind of
necessity, where through circumstances beyond one’s control, one ends up
on another’s property and causes damage. Section 166 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, is entitled: Non-liability for Accidental Intrusion. This
section provides that an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land of
another by one not engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity does not
subject the actor to liability to the possessor even though the entry causes
harm to the possessor.177 However, there is a fine line between action
deemed intentional, and that deemed unintentional.
For instance, suppose a motorist suffers a heart attack, immediately
loses consciousness, and his car runs onto plaintiff’s land, causing damages.
First City National Bank of Houston v. Japhet178 dealt with just such a
situation. The driver suffered a heart attack, lost consciousness, and died;
his car in turn ran into plaintiff’s land and caused damage to a tree and a
wall.179 The driver’s estate argued that “the occurrence was the result of an
act of God or an unavoidable accident.”180
The court referred to illustration 2 under Section 166 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
A, while driving his automobile along the street in the exercise of
due care, is suddenly overcome by a paralytic stroke, which he had
173.
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176.
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180.
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no reason to anticipate. He loses control of the automobile and
falls across the steering wheel thereby turning the car so that it
runs upon and damages B’s lawn. A is not liable to B.181
There was no liability because the intrusion was unintentional and nonnegligent.182 The actor was not legally at fault for losing control of the
automobile and destroying the property of another.183
Ruiz v. Forman,184 a 1974 Texas case, involved the intentional rather
than unintentional action of a driver. A driver swerved to avoid an oncoming vehicle and ended causing property damage to plaintiff’s land.185 In an
action for damages to the plaintiff’s property, the defendant testified that he
“consciously and intentionally turned his wheels to the right to avoid hitting
the truck,” and thereby his car entered upon the plaintiff’s land and caused
damages.186 The court commented that, given the parties’ stipulation to the
facts, this case would come within the ambit of Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as a privileged entry onto the property of another.187
However, the defendant would be liable for damages because it was an
intentional invasion.188 The entry was intentional in the sense that the
defendant intended the act which resulted in the trespass, and that in turn
caused the trespass.189
Most states would not impose liability in situations of accidental loss of
control of a vehicle in the absence of a showing of negligence.190 For example, in Phillips v. Pickwick Stages,191 a driver was proceeding down a
street when he observed that a parade was in progress and the area, which
the driver was approaching, was closed to traffic.192 A number of people

181. Id. at 73 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 illus. 2 (1965)). The full
text of section 166 (“Accidental Entries on Land”) reads:
Except where the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity, an
unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another, or causing
a thing or third person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the
possessor, even though the entry causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third
person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965).
182. Japhnet, 390 S.W.2d at 74.
183. Id.
184. 514 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
185. Ruiz, 514 S.W.2d at 817.
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2007]

VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

675

were gathered in the street ahead.193 The driver was traveling at about ten
miles per hour.194 He tried to stop, but the foot pedal, which operated the
brakes, suddenly broke.195 The driver then started to turn into a lamppost in
an effort to crash and halt the vehicle, but before reaching it a child stepped
out into the street in front his vehicle.196 At that point the driver had the
choice of either hitting the child or turning his vehicle away from the child,
in which case he would be headed toward the crowd.197 He tried to stop the
car by use of the emergency brake, but it was inadequate to bring the car to
a stop.198 He veered away from the child and into the crowd.199 Fortunately, no one was killed, but three people sustained injuries and sued for
damages.200
This case recognizes the general principle that that if a driver, in the
course of an emergency, acts as a reasonable person would in choosing to
injure the plaintiff in order to avoid a child, there is no liability for plaintiff’s injuries.201 However, the jury found that the defendant negligently
failed to sound his horn as he approached the crowd of people who had
their backs facing the defendant’s approach, and that he was further
negligent in that he should have known or discovered the defect in the foot
pedal.202
F.

AVIATION EMERGENCY LANDING CASES

Some cases involve emergency landings of airplanes in order to save
the lives of passengers and crews, which in turn destroy private property.203
In such instances it appears that the issue of damages depends strictly on
whether negligence can be shown.204
In the early years of aviation, and well into the 1950s, aviation was
regarded as an ultra-hazardous activity, requiring the imposition of strict
liability for any damage or injury caused in the course of flying.205 The
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 572-73.
197. Id. at 573.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 24 (5th ed. 1984).
202. Philips, 85 Cal. App. at 574.
203. See text accompanying notes 207-229.
204. See id.
205. See Jeffrey M. Jakubiiak, Note, Maintaining Air Safety at Less Cost: A Plan for
Replacing FAA Safety Regulations With Strict Liability, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 428
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rationale was that even the best constructed and maintained aircraft was
incapable of complete control so that flying created a risk that the plane,
even though carefully constructed, maintained and operated, may crash and
injure people and structures on the ground.
As aviation became a common mode of transportation, and as technical
strides in the navigation of aircraft developed, the courts stopped looking
upon aviation as an ultra-hazardous activity. Cases in several states, for
example, California,206 New York 207 and Washington,208 have indicated that
aviation is no longer considered an ultra-hazardous activity, so that owners
and operators of aircraft are not strictly liable for ground damage that is not
occasioned by their fault. Today, airplanes will occasionally crash mysteriously, but these often are experimental aircraft built and handled by the
owners.209 The operation of experimental aircraft continues to be regarded
as an ultra-hazardous activity and, therefore, can result in strict liability for
damages.210
Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that an intentional entry into the land of another is privileged if it reasonably appears
necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor or a third person, and that
“[w]here the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, he is
subject to liability for any harm done in the exercise of the privilege. . . to
any legally protected interest of the possessor in the land or connected with
it.”211 On this view, if the pilot’s landing of the aircraft is “intentional,”
albeit in an emergency situation, there should be liability for damages irrespective of negligence. Illustration 3 of that section provides an example of
a forced landing in which it is stipulated that the pilot was not negligent:
206. See S. California Edison Co. v. Coleman, 310 P.2d 504, 505 (Cal. App. 1957) (“There is
no California case which holds that a pilot is liable for collision damage independent of negligence”); Boyd v. White, 276 P.2d 92, 98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (identifying as the general rule
in California that “the owner (or operator) of an airship is only liable for injury inflicted upon
another when such damage is caused by a defect in the plane or its negligent operation”).
207. See Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (rejecting
strict liability in the context of operating an airplane, and applying the rule that “to constitute an
actionable trespass there must be an intent to do the very act which results in the immediate
damage”).
208. See Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co. of Washington, 746 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1987)
(“[O]wners and operators of flying aircraft are liable for ground damage caused by such aircraft
only upon a showing of negligence.”).
209. See, e.g., Mary Bender, Pilot Hurt When Experimental Aircraft Crashes in High Desert,
THE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, California), Mar. 18, 2007, at B6; David R. Anderson, Pilot’s
Son Suspects Engine Failure, THE OREGONIAN, July 18, 2006, at A6; J.C. Lexon & Amy Allyn
Swann, Trenton Plane Crash Kills Pilot, Injures Student, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Feb. 17,
2006 at B7; Architect Killed in Crash of Experimental Aircraft He Designed, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Nov. 12, 2005; Pine Island Plane Crash Kills Two, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 2005.
210. See Jakubiiak, supra note 205, at 428.
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(2) (1965).
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A, an aviator, while carefully and skillfully operating his airplane
makes a forced landing on B’s field in the reasonable belief that it
is necessary to do so for the protection of himself and his plane. A
is not liable for his mere entry, but. . . is subject to liability for any
harm thereby caused to B or to B’s buildings, crops or other
belongings.212
Thus, under the Restatement view, while there is a privilege to make a
forced landing, liability for damages is imposed irrespective of negligence,
where the entry is intentional.213
Boyd v. White,214 a California case, seems to depart from the
Restatement view because, under the Restatement illustration, the aviator is
required to pay compensation for damages, irrespective of negligence. In
Boyd, shortly after takeoff, the motor of an aircraft started to sputter, and
the pilot began to lose altitude.215 The pilot attempted to turn back to the
airport but realized he could not make it.216 He then observed a schoolyard
and a baseball field and decided to make a forced landing there.217 He
circled the field, losing altitude all the while, and did not reach the field.218
Instead, he crashed into plaintiff’s house, causing damages, but no loss of
life.219 The pilot had leased the plane, and the plaintiff sued both the pilot
and the plane’s owner.220
The court expressed the general rule that, properly handled by a
competent pilot exercising reasonable care, an airplane is not an inherently
dangerous instrument, so that the owner or the operator of an airplane is
only liable for injury inflicted upon another when such damage is caused by
a defect in the plane or its negligent operation.221 Thus, the court held that
the defendant would be liable by ordinary negligence principles, so that the
landowner would need to prove negligence in the operation or maintenance
of the aircraft in order to win damages.
Other cases concerning ground damage have focused on whether the
conduct of the pilot was volitional or involuntary in landing the aircraft.
For example, in a New York case, Wood v. United Air Lines Inc.,222 two
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. § 197 illus. 3.
Id.
276 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
Boyd, 276 P.2d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
32 Misc. 2d 955 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
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airplanes collided in midair and one of them fell onto an apartment building
and exploded, causing personal injuries and property damages. Various
plaintiffs sued for damages under the theory of trespass.223 The plaintiffs
argued strict liability for trespass and for consequent damages, “irrespective
of the absence of any negligence or of any intent to invade the rights of
those on the ground.”224 The court held that aviation is no longer considered an ultra-hazardous activity.225 Further, the court rejected the theory
of trespass, emphasizing that an essential element of a trespass is the
intention to do the very act that amounts to or produces the unlawful
invasion.226 There was no evidence that the airplane was in any way under
the pilot’s control when it plunged into the ground.227 The collision which
led to the crash did not even occur during the course of an attempt to
land.228 The court held there was no liability because the intrusion was
unintentional in that the pilots no longer were in control of the aircraft, and
non-negligent.229 The court apparently did not consider, for purposes of its
ruling, the question of whether the midair collision was a product of
negligence.
In a similar, earlier case, Southern California Edison Co. v.
Coleman,230 a California court held there was no basis for holding an
aircraft owner strictly liable for damage occurring to a utility company’s
lines when the plane struck its electric line.231 The aircraft owners claimed
that there was no trespass because an unavoidable downdraft caused the
airplane to drop to the level of the wires.232 The contact with the wires was
unintentional and not the result of negligence.233
The approach taken by the courts in the abovementioned cases is tied to
the principle, stated in Section 166 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
that an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land of another by one not
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity does not subject the actor to
liability to the possessor even though the entry causes harm to the
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possessor.234 In sum, these rulings are in opposition to rulings from an
earlier period when aviation was considered an ultra-hazardous activity.235
Following the Wood decision, the American Law Institute adopted
section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Ground Damage From
Aircraft), which imposes strict liability in such cases:
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is
caused by the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the
dropping or falling of an object from the aircraft,
(a) the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the
harm, even though he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
it, and
(b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he
has authorized or permitted the operation.236
Comment b of that section states:
Under the rule set forth in this Section, any flight by aircraft,
together with ascent to or descent from the flight, is an activity of
such a character that both the operator of the aircraft and its owner
if he has consented to or permitted the operation are subject to
strict liability for physical harm to land, or to persons or chattels
on the ground.237
Comment c of that section takes the view that
while the safety record [of aviation] is greatly improved it still
cannot be said that the danger of ground damage has been so
eliminated or reduced that the ordinary rules of negligence law
should be applied. Although there will be relatively few cases in
which an airplane falls upon a house, for example, the gravity of
the harm resulting when a few tons of flaming gasoline descend
upon a dwelling is still a factor to be taken into account. Together
with this is the obvious fact that those on the ground have no place
to hide from falling aircraft and are helpless to select any locality
for their residence or business in which they will not be exposed to

234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965).
235. See, e.g., Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (N.Y. 1933) (finding
a pilot strictly liable for damage caused when the airplane he was piloting crashed into a utility
tower); Hahn v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. N.Y. 1954) (holding an airline strictly liable for the damage caused on the ground by an airline crash in a residential area);
Margosian v. U.S. Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. N.Y. 1955) (holding an airline strictly
liable for damage caused on the ground when one of its airplanes crashed in a residential area).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1965).
237. Id. § 520A cmt. 6.
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the risk, however minimized it may be. Aviation flights differ in
this respect from other kinds of traffic and transportation.238
It should be noted that Section 520A pertains solely to ground damage,
and leaves the ordinary rules of negligence to determine liability for harm
to passengers or others participating in aviation.239 Several states have
statutes that impose strict liability for ground damage.240
The principle set forth in Section 520A has apparently not prevailed in
more recent cases, and to an extent it has been discredited. Some think it
was a “historical mistake.”241 Since 1976, when Section 520A was
promulgated, the American Law Institute has in some measure retreated
from the idea of strict liability for ground damage by aircraft. In the
Tentative Draft of Restatement (Third) of Torts, in a section called “A
special note on aviation ground damage,” the committee states that in light
of the dramatic decline in the airplane crash rate since Section 520A was
adopted, and given that airplane crashes are generally a result of negligence,
“the strict-liability issue is no longer one that has major practical
significance (and similarly explains why there are so few modern cases
considering the issue). In these circumstances, the issue is left open in this
Restatement.”242
A 1995 case apparently ignored the principle set forth in Section 520A,
and ruled along the same lines as in the Wood and Coleman cases
mentioned above. In re Air Crash Disaster at Cove Neck,243 involved a
Columbian passenger airplane that had exhausted its fuel supply while
circling La Guardia Airport waiting for clearance to land. The plane
crashed into a residential backyard in Long Island’s populated North Shore,
causing damages to non-passengers on the ground.244 The plaintiffs in this
case did not sustain physical injuries.245 The residents sued for property
damages and emotional distress as a result of witnessing the aftermath of
the crash in their yard, on the theory that the defendant committed
intentional trespass.246

238. Id. § 520A cmt. c.
239. Id. § 520A cmt. e.
240. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 305 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263-5 (2007);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.012 (2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 6:2-7 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-60
(2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 479 (2007).
241. E.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717, 742 (1993).
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. k (2001).
243. 885 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. N.Y. 1995).
244. Cove Neck, 885 F. Supp. at 437.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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The court held that the facts do not support intentional trespass because
when the plane ran out of fuel, it became impossible for the pilots to control
the aircraft and it unfortunately and accidentally crashed into the plaintiffs’
yard.247 The court noted that intentional trespass is the “intentional and
unlawful invasion of another’s land,” and that the intent requirement means
that the tortfeasor “need only intend the act which amounts to or produces
the unlawful invasion, and the intrusion must be . . . the immediate or
inevitable consequence of what . . . he does so negligently as to amount to
willfulness.”248
In similar vein, in a case from Washington State, Crosby v. Cox
Aircraft Company,249 a property owner brought action against the owner
and operator of an aircraft, seeking to recover for ground damage inflicted
by the crash landing of the aircraft.250 The highest court of that state held
that the owner and operator would be liable for ground damage only upon a
showing of negligence, and that strict liability did not apply.251 In this case,
the pilot was flying near Seattle and the engine ran out of fuel in midflight.252 There may have been something wrong with the fuel system.253
The pilot was forced to crash-land the plane, and damaged the plaintiff’s
garage.254 Of course, running out of fuel likely is negligence, but the plaintiff sought to impose strict liability. A new trial was ordered in which the
plaintiff attempted to prove negligence.255 It is not clear from this case
whether the landing was considered intentional or unintentional. It would
seem that there was an element of intentionality in that the pilot was able to
steer the plane even though the engine was not operating since there was no
more fuel.
The Crosby case had a vigorous dissent that argued Section 520A of
the Restatement ought to be applicable, and that the majority had
misinterpreted the provision.256 The dissent argued that the burden of loss
should be placed on the “person who voluntarily chose to fly that airplane,
for his own purpose and benefit” and not on the “wholly innocent, nonactive, non-benefited, but damaged person.”257 The dissent suggested that
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strong public policy seems to favor strict liability for damage occurring on
the ground.258 For example, there is an unequal distribution of the benefits
and risks of aviation between those in the air and those on the ground.
Without strict liability, there is an onerous and expensive burden of proof
required by the plaintiff in an aviation accident case (although to some
extent the National Transportation Safety Board,259 which investigates
every civil aviation accident in the United States, and provides information
that significantly eases the plaintiff’s burden in case preparation).
Moreover, the owners of aircraft have the ability to spread the financial
risks with insurance.260 Finally, a high degree of harm usually results,
despite the exercise of due care, when an airplane crashes.
G. ACTS DIVERTING A DANGER FROM THE ACTOR TO A THIRD
PARTY
Some private necessity cases involve emergencies in which one party
diverts a threat, such as flood waters, to save his own property, and in doing
so causes damage or destruction to the property of others. For example, in
Whalley v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., Co.,261 the defendant railroad cut
gaps in an embankment to protect its railroad tracks from the accumulation
of water after an unprecedented rainfall.262 The action taken by the railroad
company diverted the position at which the water would accumulate.263 As
a result of this action, the water was diverted, causing flooding of plaintiff’s
land and destruction of crops.264
The plaintiff sued for damages.265 The court concluded that “in order
to get rid of the misfortune which had happened to [the defendants] . . .
which . . . would not have injured the plaintiff, they did something which
brought an injury upon the plaintiff [and] [u]nder [these] circumstances . . .
the defendants are liable.”266 The court found that, under the necessity
doctrine, the evil to be averted (damage to the defendant’s railroad tracks)
did not outweigh the evil that resulted (damage to the plaintiff’s land). That
is, a greater good did not result.267 According to the court, the harm to the
258.
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plaintiff, as it turned out, was greater than the harm averted by the
defendant’s action, in terms of the amount of damages.268
The result was better for the defendant, but resulted in damages to the
plaintiff that would not otherwise have occurred.269 According to the court,
even if the damage to the railroad tracks had been much more extensive
than that which resulted to plaintiff’s land by diverting the waters—the
necessity doctrine does not justify harming another’s property in order to
protect one’s own under the facts of this case.270
The court alluded to an exception in situations that involve an imminent “common enemy” such as a fire that is approaching and presents a
common threat to the community.271 In a “common enemy” situation, the
actor seeks to avert an imminent harm which poses a threat to a number of
individuals in common. The following is an example of a common enemy
situation: If an extraordinary flood is seen to be coming upon a community,
and someone builds barriers to prevent the flood from encroaching upon his
land, the danger might thereby affect neighboring lands instead. The
danger in this example is a “common enemy” that equally threatens innocent parties, and in seeking a means to avert the harm to oneself, the danger
will devolve on someone else.272 Each party has an equal opportunity of
taking such measures are necessary to protect oneself, even though that may
result in injuring one’s neighbor.273
In Whalley, the danger had already “hit” the defendant’s embankment;
it was not a threat to the plaintiff’s property. There was no “common enemy” which the defendant sought to protect against. Rather, the defendants
diverted the accumulation of water that had already begun to affect the
railroad tracks, to the plaintiff.274
The Whalley case is embodied in illustration 5 of Section 197 of the
Restatement:
An unprecedented rainfall causes such a quantity of water to
accumulate against one of the sides of the A Railroad Company’s
embankment as to endanger the embankment. A is not privileged
to cut trenches and to cause the water to flow onto B’s land if the
probable harm to B’s land is in excess of or even equal to the
probable harm to A by the threatened loss of the embankment. A
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is privileged to flood B’s land if the probable harm to B’s land is
less than the probable harm to A from the loss of its embankment,
but . . . A is subject to liability to B for any harm thereby caused to
his land.275
According to Comment c of Section 197, in determining reasonableness of the actor’s conduct
the probable advantage to the actor to be expected from the entry
must be weighed against the probable detriment to the possessor of
the land or other persons properly upon it. Thus, the actor’s entry
to avoid death or serious bodily harm would be unreasonable if it
would involve a more serious or even an equal risk of harm to the
possessor of the land or other lawful occupants. Likewise, where
the entry is for the purpose of protecting the actor’s land or chattels, not only would any serious risk of harm to the person of the
possessor or other lawful occupants make the entry unreasonable,
but so would a disproportionate, or even an equal, risk of harm to
the land or chattels of the possessor or chattel of third persons
lawfully on the land.276
As mentioned, in Whalley the court found that the harm to the plaintiff’s
land was in excess of the harm that would have accrued to the defendant’s
railroad tracks.277
Another situation involves deflecting a danger from one party to
another with respect to personal property rather than real property. Section
263 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Privilege Created by Private
Necessity), is based on Section 197.278 Section 263 provides a privilege to
destroy the personal property of others in necessitous circumstances:
One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a
trespass to the chattel of another or a conversion of it, if it or is
reasonably believed to be reasonable and necessary to protect the
person or property of the actor, the other or a third person from
serious harm . . .279
The Comment to this section indicates that the act of destroying
another’s personal property to save one’s own property must not only be

275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmt. 4, illus. 5 (1965).
276. Id. § 197 cmt. c.
277. Whalley, 13 Q.B.D. at 138.
278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 cmt. b (“The statement in this Subsection is analogous in part to the privilege to enter land in the possession of another for the
protection of person or property as stated in § 197.”).
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 (1965).
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necessary but also reasonable. This is required so that “one whose chattel
of small value is threatened with serious harm or even with complete
destruction may not be privileged to destroy a far more valuable chattel of
another in order to protect it.”280
In Latta v. New Orleans & N.W. Ry.,281 two boxcars loaded with cotton
caught fire, possibly from a spark from a passing locomotive engine, or
possibly from a worker’s pipe or cigarette that may have caused smoldering
and then the fire.282 At any rate, the defendant was not at fault for causing
the boxcars to catch fire. Because the boxcars were adjacent to the depot,
and the depot was in peril of catching fire, about seven or eight people,
including employees of the defendant, pushed the burning boxcars about
twenty-five feet down the track and let one of the cars come to rest near a
storage bin which held wooden staves owned by the plaintiff. The burning
car in turn set fire to the wooden staves.283
The plaintiff sued for damages. The defendant invoked the necessity
doctrine. He argued that the burning cars imminently threatened the destruction of the defendant’s depot, that there was an impulse which led to
the removal of the burning cars to the place where they destroyed the
property of plaintiff, and that this effort to push the burning cars away from
the depot “may be regarded as natural in some sense.”284
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the defendant had no right to
sacrifice plaintiff’s property in order to save its own, and was liable for
damages.285 It stated that the removal of the burning cars to save defendant’s property from catching fire was “hardly that kind of a natural impulse which impels one to brush a wasp from one’s face or to get rid of a
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dangerous squib;286 it belongs rather to that class of sordid impulses which
may and should be restrained.”287
The defendant further argued that the law of necessity recognizes a
right of an individual to destroy the property of another in order to save his
own, where it is impracticable to save both parties’ property, and that it
would be proper to consider whether the actor averted a greater evil by
sacrificing property of lesser value than his own property, which was
saved.288 The saving of the depot, being of greater value than the wooden
staves of the plaintiff, was therefore justified.289 The court dismissed this
argument as an idea that “would lead to great injustice.”290 Thus, this case
is much the same in its analysis and result as the Whalley case. Latta
apparently is at odds with Section 263 of the Restatement—had the
Restatement view been followed, the relative values of the property sacrificed and the property saved would have been a consideration.
Swan-Finch Oil Corp. v. Warner-Quinlin Co291 presented another situation involving diverting a danger from one party to another. The defendant owned a wooden barge that contained 6000 barrels of crude fuel oil
and was moored to a dock, also owned by the defendant, in Staten Island
Sound.292 Lightning struck the barge and ignited the oil.293 The fire rapidly
spread through the barge, and the fire department was summoned. 294
Meanwhile, about ten men under the charge of the dock superintendent
prepared to fight the fire on their own.295 They cast the barge adrift by
cutting the hawsers which tied it to the dock.296 They pushed the barge,
which was still on fire, out into the stream, and, as a result, the other boats
286. A squib is a “serpent,” firecracker or other incendiary device containing gunpowder that
has a fuse which, when ignited, will burn down into the device until it explodes. OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 414 (2d ed. 1989). The court’s reference to a “dangerous squib” no doubt
had in mind the 1773 English Case, Scott v. Shepherd. The defendant Shepherd threw a squib into
a crowded marketplace. 2 Black. at 892. Two other persons hurled the squib away from
themselves before it ultimately exploded in the plaintiff’s face. 2 Black. at 892-93. The issue
before the court was whether Shepherd, the initial thrower of the squib, or the intermediate
throwers, would be liable for damages to the plaintiff. 2 Black. at 893.
There are two reports of Scott v. Shepherd: one by Blackstone, who was one of the four
judges in the case, 2 W. Black. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773), the other by Wilson, a private
reporter, at 2 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773).
287. Latta, 59 So. at 254.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 254.
291. 167 A. 211, 212 (N.J. 1933).
292. Swan-Finch Oil Corp., 167 A. at 211.
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moored at the dock were saved.297 A passing tug boat immediately pushed
the blazing barge across the stream to an island some 800 feet distant from
the dock.298 Later, a New York City fire boat arrived on the scene, and
made unsuccessful efforts to quench the fire.299 Several hours later, the
barge, was still burning, was carried away from the island by the tide.300
The city fireboat pursued it and made every effort to keep the fire from
spreading to other boats and property.301 The fireboat managed to push the
barge onto the beach of another island, but after a half an hour it again
floated away.302 Finally, the barge collided into the docks owned by the
plaintiffs, and blazing oil escaped from the hull and set fire to the plaintiffs’
property, causing extensive damage.303
The plaintiffs sued for damages caused by the burning barge.304 The
defendant argued that the necessity of the situation justified the casting
adrift of the barge. The court disagreed:
The defendant’s act in casting adrift this burning cargo of oil, in
order to save its own property from destruction, was a violation of
a legal duty owing to the plaintiffs and others whose property was
thus put in jeopardy. While it cannot be said that it was intended
by the casting adrift of this barge to set on fire the property of the
plaintiffs or any one else, nevertheless it is clear that the intent of
the defendant was to save its own property, irrespective of any
danger or consequence to the property of others. The law cannot
allow one deliberately to cast upon another any dangerous instrumentality, even in self-defense, without being answerable for the
natural consequences which follow.
....
[T]he act complained of cannot be excused because of the emergency or the necessity. Nor can it be excused on the ground that
an act of God was the immediate cause of the catastrophe. It
makes no difference, it seems to me, what the primary cause of the
fire was. The act of casting the boat adrift was dissociated from
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the act of God. It was a new and different act, creating a new
hazard.305
The court held that there was proximate cause in connection with the
damage to plaintiffs’ property.306 The damage was foreseeable and not as
remote in circumstances as to relieve the actor from liability.307
Perhaps the case hinged principally on the court’s finding that the
defendant was negligent in using a wooden barge for the transportation of
inflammable fuel oil in such a large quantity, and in mooring the barge on
the dock in close proximity to other shipping, without greater fire protection. The court’s reasoning was that the defendant created an unreasonable
risk in the first instance by using a wooden barge to carry inflammable fuel
oil, and that regardless of how the fire got started, it was reckless to have
permitted the oil to be transported on that barge.308
The decision also suggests that the defendant failed to make a
reasonable choice of evils in casting out the barge in that the action was
taken “irrespective of any danger or consequence to the property of
others.”309 The court apparently failed to consider that the action may, in
fact, have been reasonably calculated to avert a greater danger because a
number of vessels at the dock would otherwise have caught fire, perhaps
creating a greater quantum of damage than the plaintiff ended up incurring.
The record is silent as to the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff,
and the value of the boats on the dock that were saved.310 Apparently the
court deemed irrelevant the question of whether the damages that accrued
were greater, or less, than the damages averted by the defendant’s action.311
Thus, the court held that the action in casting adrift the barge was
wrong because it was foreseeable that such action would cause damage to
someone else’s property, and that the necessity doctrine simply could be
used to shield oneself from liability (except in a “common enemy” case)
where the choice of evils consists of the actor’s property versus another’s
property.312

305. Id.
306. Id. “[T]here was no intervening, culpable, and efficient agency which broke the chain of
causation, no negligence by any other actor in the premises, no elements except natural and casual
ones such as wind and tide which intervened between the starting of the wrongful act and its
conclusion.”
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The fire was caused by an act of God—lightning.313 Had the defendant
kept the barge moored where it was, the resulting, and surely inevitable,
spread of the fire to the other boats and the dock, would not have imposed
any liability. It would probably have been considered an unavoidable accident caused by an act of God. In contrast, property owners in such a situation might well recover based on negligence in that the barge should have
had a steel hull, and that flammable oil should not be transported in a
wooden vessel.
In Protectus Alpha Nav. Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers,314 a
vessel owner sued a terminal at which the ship had docked, alleging that
defendant’s employees had acted negligently in casting the burning ship
away from the dock while successful firefighting efforts were underway at
the dock.315 The defendant ordered the ship cast off in defiance of the fire
chief’s orders.316 The fire was on the verge of being extinguished.317 The
vessel’s engines were inoperable, and once the vessel was cast adrift, the
firefighters were delayed by several hours in their plan of shooting high
expansion foam into the engine room to stop the fire, at which point the engine room exploded and the fire spread rapidly to the ship’s superstructure.318 One person was killed in the explosion.319
Defendant argued, among other things, that the danger of explosion
made it reasonable and prudent for employees to cast off the ship, and that
the conduct was justified by necessity.320 On the issue of necessity, the
court held that the danger of explosion was not sufficiently imminent to
justify defendant’s conduct (in that the fire was small and confined to the
engine room), and that defendant’s conduct was not reasonable under the
circumstances.321 The court found the defendant liable for the destruction
of the ship and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.322

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 211.
585 F.Supp. 1062 (D. Ore. 1984), aff’d, 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985).
Protectus, 585 F. Supp. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1068-69.
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III. VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS BASED ON PUBLIC
NECESSITY
A. INTRODUCTION
Public necessity contemplates a situation where there is an imminent
public calamity, and in order to avert this danger it is necessary to destroy
or damage property. In the numerous cases that have considered the question of public necessity, it appears that “[w]here the danger affects the entire community, or so many people that the public interest is involved, that
interest serves as a complete justification to the defendant who acts to avert
the peril to all.”323 This means that “one has a complete privilege to
destroy, damage, or use real or personal property if the actor reasonably
believes it to be necessary to avert an imminent public disaster.”324 The
danger to be averted in cases of public necessity may pertain to property
only, or it may be a danger to property as well as to life and limb.
Section 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Public Necessity),
states: “One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is,
or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of
averting an imminent public disaster.”325 This privilege is to protect the
public from “an impending public disaster such as a conflagration, flood,
earthquake, or pestilence.”326 Section 196 is supplemented by Section 262
(Privilege Created by Public Necessity), which pertains to trespass to chattel rather than to land: “One is privileged to commit an act which would
otherwise be a trespass to chattel or a conversion if the act is or is
reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public
disaster.”327
The comments to Section 196, dealing with the privilege to enter land
in the possession of another, are applicable also to Section 262.328 Comment b of Section 262 states that the privilege in this section “is applicable
where one intermeddles with chattels in the possession of another in a
reasonable effort to protect against a public enemy, or to prevent or mitigate
the effect of conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence.”329

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 201, at § 24.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 196 & 262).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965).
Id. cmt. a.
Id. § 262.
Id. cmt. a.
Id. cmt. b.
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There is no litmus test as to what constitutes “public” as opposed to
“private” necessity. The distinction is chiefly of importance on the question
of compensation for damages, discussed below. Public necessity is
“[w]here the danger affects the entire community, or so many people that
the public interest is involved.”330 “The number of persons who must be
endangered in order to create a public necessity has not been determined by
the courts.”331
The concept of public necessity pertains not so much as to who the
agent is, but the purpose of the act, for the privilege applies to private
individuals as well as public officials.332 If the public authorities have taken
control of the situation, it would ordinarily be unreasonable for a private
individual to attempt to exercise the privilege on his own initiative. It may
happen, however, that, in the absence of a public official competent to deal
with the situation, or when the appropriate official unreasonably refuses to
act, action by a private individual to avert a public disaster would be
reasonable.333
Two broad areas of public necessity will be considered. One pertains
to military operations in time of war. The second area involves emergencies such as fire, pestilence, police activities in apprehending criminal
suspects, and other exigencies in which government officials or private
individuals take action to avert a public danger. But, first, it is necessary to
consider the issue of compensation in situations of public necessity.
B. ISSUE OF COMPENSATION
The question of compensation for the destruction or appropriation of
property in situations of public necessity is complex. The majority view is
that there is no duty to pay compensation to the owner of any property
when the action is taken based on public necessity.334 There are, however,
numerous exceptions.

330. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 201, at § 24.
331. Id.
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 cmt. b. (1965).
333. Id. § 196 cmt. e.
334. See id. § 262 cmt. d (“Since the privilege stated in this Section arises only because of
public necessity, the actor is not liable for the harm caused by its proper exercise.”); see also
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 70, 74 (1853) (holding that the government was not liable for the costs of
destroying buildings to prevent the spread of a fire); Seavey v. Preble, 64 Me. 120-22 (1874)
(holding that the government was not liable for the costs of destroying wallpaper in the homes of
smallpox victims); Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312, 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (holding that the
government was not liable for the costs of destroying mad dogs). Government destruction of
property also does not give rise to any constitutional claim for compensation against state
governments under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928)
(holding that Virginia did not have to compensate owners of cedar trees destroyed to save apple
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There are three broad areas on the question of compensation in situations of public necessity. The first area involves the seizure or destruction
of property by the military. There are two types of military activity for
purposes of evaluating the right of compensation: If the loss is occasioned
by combat activity, or to impede the advance of a hostile army (e.g.,
breaking up of roads or burning of bridges), or to destroy food or liquor
supplies that the enemy might utilize, there is generally no right of
compensation for the aggrieved party.335 On the other hand, if the military
appropriates property for its subsequent use (e.g., taking vessels to transport
military supplies, or seizing buildings to use as storehouses of war material
or to house soldiers), courts are inclined to award compensation for the
loss.336 In the latter situations, the courts generally find there is a “qualified
privilege” for the military to appropriate the property based on necessity,
but a corresponding duty for the government to compensate the owner.
Compensation in such situations is not based on the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, but on the theory of implied promise on the part of the
government to pay a reasonable compensation for the property taken or
destroyed.337
Second, if the property that is damaged or seized itself had become
dangerous and was likely to have been destroyed anyway, the aggrieved
party is not entitled to compensation.338 Cases of this sort might involve a
fire or other danger in which the property destroyed “had temporarily become dangerous itself and was likely to have been destroyed anyway.”339
A third area involves police activity—e.g., firing tear gas into a
building in order to flush out criminal suspects, in turn causing damage to
the property.340 There is generally no right of compensation so long as the
police acted reasonably, but there are some exceptions.341
In situations of public necessity where there is no legal obligation to
pay compensation for the destruction of property, there is an exception if
the entry and the action taken were unreasonable under the
trees because “preferment of [the public] interest over the property interest of the individual, to the
extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of
police power which affects property”). All of the cases just mentioned are discussed in Part III.D.
infra.
335. See discussion in Section C infra.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., supra note 201, at § 24.
340. See discussion in Section D infra.
341. See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (holding
that doctrine of public necessity did not insulate municipality to pay just compensation to homeowner who suffered property damages after police fired tear gas into his home).
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circumstances.342 The exception also applies if the actor failed to use
reasonable care to avoid doing unnecessary harm to persons or things,
“although the exigencies of the occasion must be taken into account in
judging his conduct.”343 Many believe that there is or should be a moral
obligation for public authorities to provide compensation to an aggrieved
party whose property has been destroyed by public necessity. Section 196
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts expresses this view:
Although the moral obligation to compensate the person whose
property has been damaged or destroyed for the public good is
obviously very great, and is of the kind which should be recognized by the law, the rules as to governmental immunity from suit
have stood in the past as a barrier to any effective legal remedy.
After major public disasters compensation often has been paid
under special legislation enacted for the purpose, and in several
jurisdictions general statutes provide for such compensation.344
Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes which provide for compensation in certain situations “where property is destroyed on grounds of
public necessity.”345 For instance, in Mayor of New York v. Lord,346 the
court discussed a municipal ordinance in New York passed in 1806, which
directed the mayor to compensate property owners whose property was
destroyed at the mayor’s direction to prevent the spread of fire.347 The
basis for such compensation is that the government has a moral obligation,
albeit not a legal one, to provide compensation in certain instances when
private property is destroyed due to public necessity.348
In some situations where the destruction or property occurs pursuant to
government authority, plaintiffs have successfully argued that the Takings
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. e (1965).
343. Id. cmt. e.
344. Id. cmt. h.
345. See Christie, supra note 89, at 996. In addition, numerous states have statutorily
authorized reimbursement programs for damage to property of innocent residents caused by the
police engaged in apprehending suspects. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 29631 (“The Legislature
hereby declares that it serves a public purpose, and is of benefit to the state and to every county
and city in the state, to indemnify those innocent residents of the State of California whose
property has been injured or destroyed as a result of the acts specified in Section 29632.”).
The legislative body of a county or of a city may establish a program which provides
for the reimbursement of any innocent resident . . . whose property is or has been . . .
injured or destroyed as the consequences of: (a) An act of a peace officer in the
detection of crime or the apprehension or arrest of any person for any public offense;
or (b) An act of a person in resisting or avoiding arrest.
Id. § 29632.
346. 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 285 (1837).
347. Lord, 17 Wend. at 285.
348. Id.
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in the case of the federal government, or
the comparable provisions applicable to the states under the 14th Amendment, require compensation. The Takings Clause was “designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”349
Where plaintiffs have won awards of compensation, under one theory or
another, usually property was taken or destroyed, but the property was not a
part of the threatened danger and was not itself likely to be harmed or
destroyed.
C. MILITARY NECESSITY IN SEIZING OR DESTROYING PROPERTY IN
TIME OF WAR
Generally, the destruction of private property caused by military operations during war is not subject to compensation under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.350 Examples of losses occasioned by government
troops in the operations of war include destroying bridges to prevent the
enemy from crossing them, destroying storehouses to prevent their being of
use to the enemy, seizing and destroying other types of private property so
as to prevent it from falling into the hands of enemies, taking other
measures for the safety and efficiency of troops, and other necessary and
unavoidable destruction of property from the ravages of war.351
In United States v. Caltex, Inc.,352 the Supreme Court held that the
wartime destruction of private property by the Army to prevent its imminent capture and use by an advancing enemy did not entitle the owner to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.353 The case involved orders to
demolish the facilities of an oil company terminal in the Philippines in
December, 1941, at a time when Japanese troops were invading Manila.354
The demolition rendered the facilities useless by the enemy, and the enemy
was thus deprived of a valuable logistic weapon.355 The issue before the
Court was whether the Government must compensate the owner of the
property for its destruction.356 The sole objective of the Army was to
349. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For a general discussion of the
purposes of the Just Compensation Clause, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV L. REV.
1165, 1165 (1967).
350. See discussion infra.
351. Id.
352. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
353. Caltex, 344 U.S. at 156.
354. Id. at 150-51.
355. Id. at 151.
356. Id. at 152.
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destroy property of strategic value to prevent the enemy from using it to
wage war more successfully.357
The Court found, by a seven-to-two vote, that “the common law had
long recognized that in times of imminent peril—such as when fire
threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many
more could be saved.”358 Justices Douglas and Black dissented, stating that
while there is no doubt that the military has authority to select certain
property for destruction to prevent the enemy from using it, the Fifth
Amendment requires compensation for the taking.359 “Whenever the Government determines that one person’s property—whatever it may be—is
essential to the war effort and appropriates it for the common good, the
public purse, rather than the individual, should bear the loss.”360 This view
seems to be supported by Vattel, who in his Law of Nations, discussed
damages sustained by individuals in war.361 He noted Grotius indicated to a
split of opinion on this question.362 According to Vattel, there are two
kinds of damages to be distinguished.363 The state is not required to
indemnify those who suffer damages done by inevitable necessity, the
havoc done by the artillery in engagements and other calamities arising
from action in the field.364 In these cases
the public finances would be soon exhausted. Every one must
contribute his share in due proportion, which would be impracticable. Besides, these indemnifications would be liable to a thousand abuses, and there would be no end of the particulars; it is
therefore to be supposed that no such thing was ever meant by
those who formed a society.365
On the other hand, Vattel appears to agree with the dissenting opinion
in Caltex that, with respect to military action by the state
done voluntarily and by precaution, as when a field, a house, or
garden, belonging to a private person, is made use of for building
the rampart of a town, or some other piece of fortification; when

357. Id. at 153.
358. Id. at 154.
359. Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
360. Id.
361. M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, Book III, ch. 15, § 232 (Simeon Butler,
Northampton, Mass. 1820).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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his standing corn, or his store houses are destroyed to prevent their
being of use to the enemy. Such damages are to be made good to
the owner, who should bear only his quota.366
Perhaps the case mainly hinged on the distinction between
“destruction” and “use.” Because the claimant’s property was demolished
in order to prevent capture by the enemy, rather than appropriated for
subsequent use, the Court refused to grant compensation.367 Perhaps this is
a nonsensical distinction—that between destroying property of strategic
value and taking property for subsequent use by the military. In either
instance, the owner has been deprived of property.
The Caltex case distinguished Mitchell v. Harmony,368 in which the
Supreme Court considered the necessity doctrine in connection with the
appropriation of property for subsequent use in a military campaign.369 The
question in Mitchell was under what circumstances private property may be
taken from the owner by a military officer in a time of war.370 More
specifically, the question was whether a military officer might take private
property simply to insure the success of any military enterprise that a
commanding officer may deem advisable to undertake against the enemy.371
The case involved the seizure of mules, wagons and goods of an
American merchant who was headed to Mexico just before the war
commenced between the United States and Mexico.372 The merchant was
forced to accompany American troops against his will, together with his
goods, which eventually were disposed of in Mexico by order of the
commander of the American forces.373
The commander sought to justify the seizure, in part, to prevent the
property from falling into the hands of the enemy.374 In addition, he sought
to justify the seizure based on the assertion that it would ensure the success
of the expedition upon which the commander was embarking.375 At trial,
the jury did not find that a danger or necessity existed, and ruled in favor of
the claimant.376

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id.
United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 132.
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On review, the Supreme Court stated that the necessity doctrine allows
for property to be seized for public use “in case of an immediate and
pressing danger or urgent necessity existing at the time, but not otherwise.”377 The Court found, “the property was seized not to defend [the
troops’] position, nor to place the troops in a safer one, nor to anticipate the
attack of an approaching enemy, but to insure the success of a distant and
hazardous expedition some time” in the future.378
In regard to the powers of a military commander, the Court stated:
But it must be remembered that the question here, is not as to the
discretion he may exercise in his military operations or in relation
to those who are under his command. His distance from home,
and the duties in which he is engaged, cannot enlarge his power
over the property of a citizen, nor give to him, in that respect, any
authority which he would not, under similar circumstances,
possess at home. And where the owner has done nothing to forfeit
his rights, every public officer is bound to respect then, whether he
finds the property in a foreign or hostile country, or in his own.
There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may
lawfully be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from
falling into the hands of the public enemy; and also where a
military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress
private property into the public service or take it for public use.
Unquestionably, in such cases, the government is bound to make
full compensation to the owner; but the officer is not a trespasser.
But we are clearly of opinion, that in all of these cases the danger
must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the
public service, such as will not admit of delay, and where the
action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the
means which the occasion calls for. It is impossible to define the
particular circumstances of danger or necessity in which this
power may be lawfully exercised. Every case must depend on its
own circumstances. It is the emergency that gives the right, and
the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be
justified.379
The Court concluded that there was no public necessity in the taking of
the private property under the circumstances of the Mexican campaign, and
377. Id.
378. Id. at 135.
379. Id. at 134.
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that the owner should be compensated.380 The Court pointed out that the
standard for determining if a necessity exists is one of reasonableness:
In deciding upon this necessity . . . the state of the facts, as they
appeared to the officer at the time he acted, must govern the
decision; for he must necessarily act upon the information of
others as well as his own observation. And if, with such information as he had a right to rely upon, there is reasonable ground for
believing that the peril is immediate and menacing, or the necessity urgent, he is justified in acting upon it; and the discovery
afterwards that it was false or erroneous, will not make him a
trespasser. But it is not sufficient to show that he exercised an
honest judgment, and took the property to promote the public
service; he must show by proof the nature and character of the
emergency, such as he had reasonable grounds to believe it to be,
and it is then for a jury to say, whether it was so pressing as not to
admit of delay; and the occasion such, according to the
information upon which he acted, that private rights must for the
time give way to the common and public good.381
The Mitchell Court made reference to a 1774 English case, Mostyn v.
Fabrigas.382 Lord Mansfield, in writing the decision in Mostyn, referred to
an unpublished case against Captain Gambier of the British Navy who,
following orders, “pulled down the houses of some sutlers on the coast of
Nova Scotia who were supplying sailors with . . . liquor.”383 Lord
Mansfield found that the action was done “with a good intention . . . for the
health of the sailors was affected” by frequenting the houses where liquor
was offered.384 The Supreme Court, in commenting on Captain Gambier’s
action, concluded that the action was “evidently a laudable one” in that it
performed a public service in the protection of the morals of the sailors.385
However, one of the sutlers whose house had been destroyed sued Captain
Gambier in England, and a thousand pounds damages were awarded against
the Captain.386 The Supreme Court, in noting this result with approval,

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 180 (1774).
Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 136
See Mostyn, 1 Cowp. at 181.
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stated that Captain Gambier’s action “was an invasion of the rights of
private property, and without the authority of law.”387
President Grant, eighty years before the Caltex decision, vetoed a bill
of Congress that originated in the Senate Committee on Claims, which
authorized compensation for a house and its contents that had been ordered
destroyed by the commanding officer of the Union forces “in defense of the
city of Paducah, Kentucky, in March, 1864.”388 The city was under siege
by the Confederates.389 Federal troops retreated to Fort Anderson for
protection.390 Confederate sharpshooters seized possession of the claimant’s house, which was about one hundred and fifty yards from the fort, and
fired on the fort late into the night, but Union fire managed to drive them
away from the house.391 Anticipating that the Confederate forces would
appear with reinforcements in the morning to continue their assault, the
Union officer in command gave orders for “the destruction of all houses
within musket-range of the fort,” including the claimant’s house.392 The
purpose was to prevent the reinforced Confederate soldiers from taking
positions in the houses.393 The Senate Committee on Claims concluded that
the “burning of the house to prevent its being used by the sharp-shooters of
the enemy was a taking by the government of private property for public
use, for which compensation should be made.”394
President Grant declared in his veto message that the payment of this
claim would invite the presentation of demands for very large sums of
money against the government for necessary and unavoidable destruction of
property by the army. According to him,
[i]t is a general principle of both international and municipal law
that all property is held subject, not only to be taken by the government for public uses, in which case, under the Constitution of the
United States, the owner is entitled to just compensation, but also
subject to be temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed, in
times of great public danger, and when the public safety demands
it; and in this latter case governments do not admit a legal
obligation on their part to compensate the owner. The temporary

387. Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 136. Lord Mansfield, commenting about the case of Captain
Gambier, said that the decision was “very likely erroneous.” Mostyn, 1 Cowp. at 181.
388. United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1881).
389. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. at 237.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 238.
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occupation of, injuries to, and destruction of property caused by
actual and necessary military operations, is generally considered to
fall within the last-mentioned principle. If a government makes
compensation under such circumstances, it is a matter of bounty
rather than of strict legal right.395
It seems that the reasoning of President Grant in this veto message is
consistent with the principles set forth in Caltex. In both situations, the
property was destroyed at a time of great public danger, as part of military
operations to prevent the enemy from gaining a strategic advantage.
The notion that the sovereign has the right to destroy private property
in times of great public danger when the public safety demands it, seems to
have gotten its initial imprimatur in a 1606 English ruling known as the
Saltpeter Case.396 This case dealt with the right of the sovereign to utilize
private property for defense purposes in time of war.397 The question was
what prerogative the King had in digging and taking of saltpeter from the
freehold estates of subjects, to make gunpowder to be used in defense of the
realm.398 The objective was to avoid having to buy saltpeter in foreign
countries because of the difficulty involved.399 The case discussed the
principle that if enemies come upon coastal lands, the King has the right to
make trenches or bulwarks for the defense of the realm because this is for
the public benefit.400 In doing so, the King must take care not to “undermine, weaken, or impair any of the walls or foundations of any houses” or
“barns, stables, dove-houses, mills, or any other buildings.”401 The court
also laid out guidelines to be observed by the King’s workers in digging up
saltpeter—such as restoring the property to good condition after digging,
and working only between sunrise and sunset.402
Harrison v. Wisdom403 involved the defense of public necessity asserted by private individuals (rather than public officials) to justify the
destruction of private stores of liquor before an invading army entered the
city.404 This case, decided by a Tennessee court, is similar to the Captain
Gambier situation mentioned above, except that here the liquor was
395. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4155 (1872) (veto message of President
Ulysses S. Grant, Cong. Globe).
396. 12 Co. 12 (1606).
397. Saltpeter, 12 Co. at 12.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 13.
402. Id. at 14.
403. 54 Tenn. 99, 1872 WL 3738 (1872).
404. Harrison, 54 Tenn. 99, 1872 WL 3738 at *1.
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destroyed to prevent the enemy, rather than one’s own soldiers, from
getting to the liquor supply.
In February 1862, citizens of Clarksville, Tennessee, convened a
meeting to see what they could do to protect themselves in anticipation of
an immediate invasion by the Union Army.405 The citizens believed they
needed to act on their own based on public necessity inasmuch as the
municipal government had collapsed.406 Fort Donelson, only thirty miles
away, had capitulated to the Federal forces.407 At the time there was a large
quantity of whiskey and other liquor in the hands of merchants and dealers
in Clarksville, and the people feared that if it should fall into the hands of
the Federal soldiers, “then flushed with victory and inflamed with the evil
passions of civil war,” their lives would be in peril.408
The choice of evils was either to destroy the liquor supply or to allow
the soldiers to find it, with the likely outcome that they would get
intoxicated and excessively rowdy. The people thus decided to destroy the
liquor stocks, and to levy a special tax in order to raise a fund to reimburse
those whose property was thus destroyed.409 Later, one merchant (apparently who had not been reimbursed) sued some of the citizens who participated in the destruction of the liquor, to recover damages.410 Apparently
the other merchants filed separate lawsuits.411
The judge instructed the jury as follows:
If it appears the destruction of the whiskey was done under the
belief that it was necessary to the safety of the public, that is a
question resting with you from the proof. Whether that the danger
was imminent and impending, or that the citizens had reasonable
grounds to believe that the destruction of the property was necessary for the public safety, to ascertain that you will look to the
proof. In arriving at your conclusion on this point you will look to
the state and condition of the country, the fall of fort Donelson, the
advance of the hostile forces, the nature of the property destroyed,
its effects upon men, and the consequences that might result from
permitting it to fall into the hands of hostile forces. . . . [I]f you

405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. See id. at *2. It was noted in the appeal that the trial judge had been present at the
citizens’ meeting but took no part in the debates, and refused to disqualify himself from presiding
in the trial. Id.
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are satisfied that the danger was imminent and impending, and the
destruction of the property a public necessity for the safety of the
public, then the defendants were justified in its destruction. . . . It
must not be imaginary, but real danger to the public, as stated.412
The jury found in favor of the defendants, based on public necessity.413 No
damages were awarded for the loss of property.414 The appellate court upheld the verdict and pronounced that the right to destroy property in cases
of extreme emergency may be exercised by individuals in any proper case,
free from all liability for the value of the property destroyed.415 The court
noted that the usual cases of public necessity are “to prevent the spread of a
fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other
great public calamity.”416 The court reasoned that the advance of a hostile
army is “among the exigencies when such a necessity might exist to justify
the destruction of private property.”417
Another case of military necessity in which an aggrieved landowner
was denied compensation involved the following facts: During the invasion
of the British in 1814-15, in order to prevent the British troops from
bringing up munitions to the city of New Orleans, a commanding officer
caused a levee to be cut through, and this in turn inundated the plantation of
a citizen. The inundation remained until the departure of the invading
army, and caused destruction of crops and expenses on the claimant’s part
to repair the levee. The losses were denied on the grounds that they were
sustained in the necessary operations of war, for which the United States
was not liable.418
United States v. Pacific Railroad Co.419 was another case in which a
claimant was denied compensation for property that was destroyed due to
military necessity. In this case, Union Army forces during the Civil War
destroyed bridges of a railroad company as they retreated, in order to
impede the advance of the Confederate Army.420 The railroad sued the
government for damages.421 The Supreme Court held that this act did not

412. Id.
413. Id. at *1.
414. Id.
415. Id. at *6.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. United States v. Pac. R.R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 236 (1881) (citing AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS, Class XIV, Claims, 835 (1822); 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 311 (1822)).
419. 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
420. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 229.
421. Id. at 228.
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constitute a compensable taking by the United States under the Fifth
Amendment:
The destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the
bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the
war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences. Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the
enemy, as the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or
would cripple and defeat him, as destroying his means of
subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the commanding general.
Indeed, it was his imperative duty to direct their destruction. The
necessities of the war called for and justified this. The safety of
the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private
loss.422
The Court added:
The principle that, for injuries to or destruction of private property
in necessary military operations during the civil war, the government is not responsible, is thus considered established. Compensation has been made in several such cases, it is true; but it has
generally been . . . “a matter of bounty rather than of strict legal
right.”423
The Court distinguished situations involving the destruction of
property during battle and supportive maneuvers due to military necessity,
and the appropriation of property for the use by the military,
where property of loyal citizens is taken for the service of our
armies, such as vessels, steam-boats, and the like, for the transport
of troops and munitions of war; or buildings to be used as
storehouses and places of deposit of war material, or to house
soldiers or take care of the sick, or claims for supplies seized and
appropriated. In such cases, it has been the practice of the
government to make compensation for the property taken. Its
obligation to do so is supposed to rest upon the general principle of
justice that compensation should be made where private property
is taken for public use, although the seizure and appropriation of
private property under such circumstances by the military
authorities may not be within the terms of the constitutional
clause.424

422. Id. at 234.
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Where, as pointed out above, the Government should pay compensation for
the appropriation of property for the service of the military, the compensation is apparently not based on the Takings Clause but on the principle of
implied promise in contract law. This principle was set forth in an 1871
Supreme Court case, United States v. Russell.425 The case involved the
seizure, pursuant to military order, of three steamboats owned by Russell,
by the Union Army during the Civil War.426 The boats were used to carry
government freight in furtherance of the war effort.427 Following this service, the vessels were returned to the owner.428 The owner sued the government for compensation for the use of his steamboats.429 The Supreme Court
said that clearly the emergency was such that officers were justified in
ordering the steamboats into the service of the United States, due to
“imperative military necessity.”430
Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise . . . beyond all doubt,
in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and
impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated
to the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of
the owner.431
The Court added:
Such a taking of private property by the government, when the
emergency of the public service in time of war or impending
public danger is too urgent to admit of delay, is everywhere
regarded as justified, if the necessity for the use of the property is
imperative and immediate, and the danger, as heretofore described,
is impending, and it is equally clear that the taking of such
property under such circumstances creates an obligation on the
part of the government to reimburse the owner to the full value of
the service. Private rights, under such extreme and imperious
circumstances, must give way for the time to the public good, but
the government must make full restitution for the sacrifice.432
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Thus, the Court ordered that damages be paid to reimburse the owner
for the use of the steamboats, for his own services and expenses in
navigating them, and for the crews provided in transporting government
freight.433 The Court based its decision not on the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, but on the theory of implied promise on the part of the
United States to pay a reasonable compensation for the services rendered.434
Another case involving the destruction of property due to military
necessity was Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,435 in which the Supreme
Court denied recovery to the American owners of a factory that had been
destroyed by American soldiers in Cuba because it was thought that the
structure housed the germs of a contagious disease.436 United States troops,
during the war with Spain in 1898, were engaged in military operations in
Cuba, and sought to prevent the spread of yellow fever, which threatened
the lives of United States troops, by destroying all buildings which might
contain the fever germs.437 Various structures owned by the claimant, who
owned an iron works facility and numerous dwellings occupied by its
employees, were destroyed by order to the commanding officer by the
advice of his medical staff.438 The Court held that the destruction of the
property was a necessity of war, required for the health and safety of the
troops at that location, and did not give rise to a legal right of
compensation.439
The Court mentioned that its ruling applied despite the fact that the
property appropriated for military use was owned by an American citizen,
and that the case was governed by the general rule that property found in
enemy territory is enemy property regardless of the status of the owner.440
The Court of Claims, which initially decided the Juragua case, stated in its
opinion:
The law seems to be well settled that when a citizen of one
belligerent country is doing business in the other belligerent country, and has built up and purchased property there which has a

433. Id. at 630.
434. Id. “[I]t is quite clear that the obligation in this case to reimburse the owner of the
steamboats was of a character to raise an implied promise on the part of the United States to pay a
reasonable compensation for the service rendered . . .” Id.
435. 212 U.S. 297 (1909).
436. Jurugua Iron Co., 212 U.S. at 301.
437. Id.
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440. Id. at 306.

706

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:651

permanent situs, such property is subject to the same treatment as
property of the enemy.441
The Supreme Court emphatically affirmed that idea:
The plaintiff, although an American corporation, doing business in
Cuba, was, during the war with Spain, to be deemed an enemy to
the United States with respect of its property found and then used
in that country, and such property could be regarded as enemy’s
property, liable to be seized and confiscated by the United States
in the progress of the war then being prosecuted; indeed, subject
under the laws of war to be destroyed whenever, in the conduct of
military operations, its destruction was necessary for the safety of
our troops or to weaken the power of the enemy.442
We might observe that this case seems to depart from the Mostyn case,
mentioned above, in which Captain Gambier had to pay damages to a
claimant for the destruction of a house in which liquor was served to the
troops. In both the Mostyn case and the Juragua Iron case, the destruction
of property was accomplished for the health and welfare of the troops.
In Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States,443 an American corporation
owning three glove manufacturing plants liberated by the U.S. Army in East
Germany, sued in the Court of Claims for compensation after the Government handed over the plants to Russia and Czechoslovakia as part of an
agreement for the division of German territory in August, 1945.444 The
properties were seized by the Germans on the ground that they were United
States enemy property.445 “Toward the end of the war, . . . the territory in
which plaintiff’s three plants were located was liberated from German
occupation” and came under the authority of the United States Military
Command.446 Thereafter, the area encompassing one of plaintiff’s plants
was incorporated into the Russian zone of occupation, and under the
Potsdam Agreement Russia was authorized to dismantle and remove all
industrial equipment therein.447 The two other plants of the plaintiff,
located in Czechoslovakia, came under control of Czechoslovakia and when
a Communist regime took control of the government, these two plants were
nationalized.448 Thus, all three of plaintiff’s manufacturing plants were
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
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448.

Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99, 1907 WL 886, at *9 (Jan. 28, 1907).
Juragua Iron Co., 212 U.S. at 306.
420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
Aris Gloves, 420 F.2d at 1387-88.
Id. at 1388.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2007]

VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

707

confiscated and transferred away by the United States as a kind of war
booty, “but without the payment of any compensation by any of the three
countries involved (Germany, Russia, or Czechoslovakia).”449
The plaintiff contended that the above set of circumstances amounted
to taking of its property by the Government without just compensation.450
It was plaintiff’s position that the Government “should be obliged to
compensate it for its losses since defendant failed to protect its property
interests, and since defendant even went to the point of actually authorizing
a third party to take control of plaintiff’s property without first requiring
just compensation.”451
The Court of Claims agreed that the Government by its action deprived
the plaintiff of its interest in the property, and enabled Russia and
Czechoslovakia to obtain the use or benefit of the property, but nonetheless
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover either under the Fifth Amendment
or on the basis of an implied contract.452 The main basis for denial of the
claim was the general rule “that all property located in enemy territory,
regardless of ownership, is in time of war regarded as enemy property
subject to the laws of war.”453 At the time of the taking, the United States
was engaged in a war. Therefore, the question must be governed by those
cases which deal with wartime appropriations of private property.
The court relied heavily on Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, which
we discussed above.454 The court stated:
It should be noted further that the Court of Claims in deciding
Juragua even went to the point of ruling that if the plaintiff’s
property was not considered as “enemy property,” there would still
be no means of recovery for the plaintiff since the destruction was
justified by the necessity of carrying on military operations.455
The court further stated that “we feel that certain governmental actions
which might appear to be a taking should not be so labeled when they are
the result of a wartime situation.”456 As a separate issue, the court said that
the action was proper even though the war was over.457 According to the

449. Id.
450. Id. at 1390.
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453. Id. at 1391 (citing Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909); Young v.
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court, “The war power continues past the end of hostilities and into that
period during which the evils which gave rise to the hostilities are sought to
be remedies.”458
Another case from World War II, Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United
States,459 involved a claim by fishermen who were prevented from carrying
on their normal fishing operations.460 A fish catching and processing business sued for losses resulting when naval officers ordered two of plaintiff’s
fishing vessels seized and ordered into port at Balboa.461 The issue
considered by the Court of Claims was whether the actions of U.S. naval
officers in preventing plaintiff’s ships from continuing fishing operations
amounted to an appropriation of the ships to which they were entitled to
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.462
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, military and
naval commanders charged with the defense of the Panama Canal believed
that the next Japanese attack would be on the Panama Canal.463 They
decided to secure the western approaches to the Panama Canal to better
detect the presence of any unknown or unidentified, and presumably hostile, forces in the region.464
The military command in the region intercepted radio messages from
tuna clippers, including those of plaintiff, and the messages were transmitted in secret code.465 It was known that companion fishing vessels
would signal each other when large schools of tuna were located, and the
use of coded messages was to prevent competitive vessels from coming into
the location.466 Commanders were further aware that some Japanese nationals were serving on the crews of tuna vessels.467 They therefore
regarded the fishing vessels with suspicion.468 They believed that Americans among the fishing crews might be captured and coerced into providing
military information to the enemy, and that fishing vessels might be seized
by the Japanese naval authorities.469 They thus concluded that the fishing
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vessels in the area constituted a serious threat to the security of the Panama
Canal.470
Naval officials issued orders to regard fishing vessels and similar craft
in offshore water with suspicion, and to search, sink or seize them, as
justified.471 In addition, it was ordered that all fishing operations in the
western approaches to the Panama Canal be terminated, and that all fishing
vessels that remained there be seized and escorted into the Balboa, the
closest American port, to be inspected and searched and to have their crews
interrogated.472 It was deemed impractical to engage in a less severe
course, such as simply searching the vessels at sea and interviewing the
crews.473 This could subject the naval ships to attack by Japanese submarines while they lay at rest in the waters during such searches.474 On
December 20, 1941, after the fishing vessels were brought into Balboa,
orders were given to the captains of the vessels, including the two owned by
the plaintiff, to leave Balboa Harbor and embark to San Pedro,
California.475
The plaintiff sued for damages resulting from its inability to use its
vessels for fishing purposes.476 The claim was also made for the value of
fish and other property that were destroyed or jettisoned as a result of the
termination of its fishing operations, and other damages.477
The Court of Claims concluded: “The exercise of [the Government’s]
regulatory and police powers, war powers or emergency powers in cases of
imminent peril to the general welfare do not fall within the fifth amendment
limitation, although taking of private property often resulted.”478 The court
made clear a distinction between an exercise of the eminent domain power,
which would require compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and an
exercise of the police power, which does not require compensation.479
Accordingly, a compensable taking occurs when “a property interest is
taken from the owner and applied to the public use because the use of such
property is beneficial to the public,” while in contrast, “in the exercise of
the police power, the owner’s property interest is restricted or infringed
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upon because his continued use of the property is or would otherwise be
injurious to the public welfare.”480
In this case, the ships were not seized or ordered into port for use by
the United States, “but the action was taken entirely as a defensive
measure” to defend western approaches to the Panama Canal from enemy
attack.481 The action was justified because of the sneak attack on Pearl
Harbor plus the interception of coded messages from the fishing fleet that
could have been a threat.482
The court underscored that the action in this case involved necessary
military measures.483 The actions of the naval officers in interrupting the
fishing operations were “clearly emergency actions demanded by the circumstances taken in the national defense, and were completely unrelated to
a direct appropriation of plaintiff’s property for public use.”484 The court
noted that none of the property lost by the plaintiff was physically taken by
naval officers. The loss of fishing profits was an incidence of the naval
action.485 The accidental spoilage of fish and destruction of bait were all
consequential results of the naval actions, but was not a taking that would
be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.486 The court relied in part on
the Pacific Railroad case which was discussed above, for the proposition
that the government was immune from liability for confiscation of private
property taken and destroyed, where the action was to prevent the property
from falling into enemy hands, or to protect the health of troops, or as an
incidental element of defense against hostile attack.487
In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,488 the Supreme Court
construed the War-Time Prohibition Act,489 passed on November 11, 1918,
which prohibited the sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes until
such time as the President issues a proclamation indicating the termination
of demobilization of forces in Germany.490 The purpose of the Act was to
conserve manpower of the nation and to increase efficiency in the production of arms, munitions, ships, food and clothing for the armed forces. The
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Kentucky Distilleries and another company sued to have the Act declared
unconstitutional.491 The Supreme Court considered several issues.
First, the Court considered whether the Act was void because it takes
private property for public purposes without compensation, in violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.492 It was argued that Congress, under the war powers granted to it, might temporarily regulate the
sale of liquor, and even forbid the sale of liquor in order to guard and
promote the efficiency of the war effort, but not without making
compensation.493 The Court concluded that “[t]here was no appropriation
of the liquor for public purposes.”494 The Act simply fixed a period of
seven months and nine days from its passage during which those engaged in
the business might dispose of stocks on hand free from any restrictions,
following which the restrictions took effect.495 The Court said this was a
reasonable period during which merchants might freely dispose of their
stocks of distilled spirits.496
Second, the petitioners also argued that even though the President had
not issued a proclamation announcing the completion of demobilization of
forces, the Act had ceased to be valid because in fact the war was over. The
Court replied:
In view of facts of public knowledge . . . that the treaty of peace
has not yet been concluded, that the railways are still under national control by virtue of the war powers, that other war activities
have not been brought to a close, and that it can not even be said
that the man power of the nation has been restored to a peace
footing, we are unable to conclude that the act has ceased to be
valid.497
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer498 is one of the most famous
cases that pertains to the Korean War.499 In 1951, a dispute between steel
companies and their employees over new collective bargaining agreements
threatened to result in a stoppage of steel production.500 To avert a
nationwide strike, President Harry S. Truman, believing he had inherent
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powers as President to seize most of the nation’s steel mills to prevent labor
disputes from stopping steel production, and to thereby avert a national
catastrophe, issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce
to take possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel mills.501 The
order contained a finding that the President’s action was necessary to avoid
a national catastrophe, because a work stoppage would immediately imperil
the national defense, and steel production was indispensable to all weapons
and other materials in the nation’s war effort in Korea.502 The Secretary in
turn directed the presidents of the various seized companies to serve as
operating managers for the United States.503 They were directed to carry on
their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the
Secretary.504
The steel companies sued to challenge the validity of the seizure as not
authorized by an act of Congress or any constitutional provisions.505 The
District Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary
from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants and from acting
under the executive order.506
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stated, “[t]he President’s
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself[,]” that Congress had not authorized the seizure,507 and that the President has no constitutional authority under the
circumstances to seize private property for national defense even though an
emergency existed.508 The Court suggested that Congress, not the
President, has authority to condemn a “plant, factory, or industry in order to
promote industrial peace.”509 Thus, the Court held that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, has no ultimate power to take possession of private
property in order to keep labor disputes from disrupting production of steel
needed for prosecuting a war; rather, this is a function for the Congress.510
The Court noted that Congress had explicitly rejected granting
authority to the President to seize plants in order to deal with labor disputes
when it enacted the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-
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Hartley Act).511 In a concurring opinion, Justice Clark pointed out that,
instead of seizing the companies, the President could have sought injunctive
relief under that Act for an eighty-day period against a work stoppage if, in
his opinion, “a threatened or actual strike affecting an entire industry will, if
permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national health or safety.”512
In the event a strike is not settled within the eighty-day injunction period,
the Act directs the President to submit to Congress “a full and comprehensive report. . . together with such recommendations as he may see fit to
make for consideration and appropriate action.”513 Congress, in turn, would
have the opportunity “to determine whether special legislation should be
enacted to meet the emergency at hand.”514 Congress had authorized a
procedure which the President declined to follow.515 Thus, the President
had a reasonable, legal way out of the emergency other than taking the unilateral action he did.
A principal concern of the steel companies was that even if the
properties were unlawfully taken by government officials for public use,
they might be denied compensation for any damages which they would
suffer.516 They would be denied compensation because prior decisions of
the Supreme Court had cast doubt on the right to recover in the Court of
Claims for properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public
use.517 In addition, the companies were concerned that the seizure “of these
going businesses were bound to result in many present and future damages
of such a nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement.”518
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States519 also
involved the destruction of property occasioned by military necessity.520
The owners of a ship, the S.S. Santo Domingo, sued its insurance company
to recover for the loss of the ship.521 “The ship was seized by rebels while
511. Id. at 601-02 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
512. Id. at 663 (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 176).
513. Id. (quoting Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 176).
514. Id.
515. See id. (“The Selective Service Act of 1948 gives the President specific authority to
seize plants which fail to produce goods.”).
516. Id. at 585.
517. Id. It seems that the steel companies’ concern here was misplaced. The two cases they
cited were Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910) (denying a claim for rent from the
Government above and beyond what the Congress had appropriated); and United States v. North
American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920)(allowing a claim for compensation under theory of implied
promise, after the Secretary of War appropriated claimant’s land to provide quarters for troops,
but denying interest as not authorized by statute).
518. Id.
519. 453 F.2d 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
520. Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co., 453 F.2d at 1381.
521. Id. at 1380.
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in port in the City of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic” in
1965.522 Thereafter, rebels directed small arms and automatic weapon fire
against soldiers of the United States Army who were occupying parts of the
city to protect United States citizens.523 “The U.S. army returned the fire
and sank the ship.”524
The insurance company defended the suit by claiming that the policy
contained an exclusion of claims arising from certain acts of the United
States Government, “to wit: capture, seizure, arrest, restraint, detainment,
preemption, confiscation, or requisition.”525 The District Court held against
the insurance company, finding that none of these situations existed.526 The
company in turn settled the claim by paying the ship owners $800,000.527
Thereafter the insurance company filed suit against the United States
for subrogation of the insurance payment, claiming “that the sinking of the
ship was the taking of private property for public use by the United States
without just compensation. The court held that there was no taking of the
ship by the United States either for public use or otherwise.”528
Certainly, if the government had intended to use the ship, it would
not have sunk it. Also, even if it could be argued that there was a
taking because of the destruction of the vessel, it was a noncompensable taking. It is clear that the ship was destroyed in connection with the carrying on of military operations of the United
States Army for the protection of its citizens in what amounted to a
civil war. . . . In other words, the vessel was destroyed as a part of
the fortunes of war and by actual and necessary military operations
in attacking and defending against enemy forces.529
National Board of YMCAs v. United States,530 involved a “suit against
the United States for damages done by rioters to buildings occupied by
United States troops during the riots in Panama on January [9,] 1964.”531
The riots started when an unruly mob of 1500 people marched into the
Panama Canal Administration Building and raised a Panamanian flag.532
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The petitioner owned two buildings nearby, the YMCA Building and the
Masonic Temple, which were situated next to each other.533 Members of
the mob proceeded to the buildings owned by the petitioner, entered them,
began looting and wrecking the interiors, and started a fire in the YMCA
Building.
U.S. Army troops entered the buildings and ejected the rioters. “The
mob [then proceeded] to assault the soldiers with rocks, bricks, plate glass,
Molotov cocktails, and intermittent sniper fire. The troops moved inside
the buildings to protect themselves. The buildings remained under siege
throughout the night.”534 The next morning the YMCA was set afire from a
barrage of Molotov cocktails.535 The troops withdrew to the parking lot,
and then sought protection from the mob in the Masonic Temple.536 The
mob exerted extensive fire-bomb activity against that structure as well.537
“On January 13, the mob dispersed.”538 There was extensive damage to the
YMCA building, and considerable damage to the Masonic building.539
The troops had entered the petitioner’s buildings in order to protect the
buildings under attack.540 They expelled the rioters from the buildings, but
they also were forced to retreat into the buildings.541 The Court articulated
a “particular intended beneficiary” test for determining whether compensation was owed under the Fifth Amendment.542 Under the test, when a
“private party is the particular intended beneficiary of the governmental
activity, fairness and justice do not require that losses which may result
from that activity be borne by the public as a whole, even though the
activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the public.”543
According to the Court:
fairness and justice do not require that losses which may result
from that activity be borne by the public as a whole, even though
the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the
public. . . . Were it otherwise, governmental bodies would be
liable under the Just Compensation Clause to property owners
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every time policemen break down the doors of buildings to foil
burglars thought to be inside.544
The Court added:
The Constitution does not require compensation every time violence aimed against government officers damages private property.
Certainly, the Just Compensation Clause could not successfully be
invoked in a situation where a rock hurled at a policeman walking
his beat happens to damage private property. Similarly, in the instant case, we conclude that the temporary, unplanned occupation
of petitioners’ buildings in the course of battle does not constitute
direct and substantial enough government involvement to warrant
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.545
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart seemed to affirm the general
principle that the government ordinarily pays for private property used to
shelter its officials:
If United States military forces should use a building for their own
purposes—as a defense bastion or command post, for example—it
seems to me this would be a Fifth Amendment taking, even though
the owner himself were not actually deprived of any personal use
of the building. Since I do not understand the Court to hold otherwise, I join its judgment and opinion.546
Here, the suggestion is that if soldiers use someone’s property to seek
shelter or as a defensive position, compensation for the taking would be
required. This is the same principle as in the Russell case, above, involving
the appropriation of steamboats to transport military freight.
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in the YMCA case, arguing that
the troops indeed moved into these buildings to protect themselves while
carrying out the mission of safeguarding the entire zone from the rioters.547
The Army used the buildings as a shelter and fortress, rather than to protect
the buildings for the good of the owners.548 The occupation of the buildings
was for the general benefit of the public, that is, for the purpose of protecting the troops in its effort to thwart the rioters.549 Thus, according to the
dissent, the Government rather than the individual should bear the loss.550

544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 99 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Id.
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The implication of the ruling is that damage resulting from police
activity constitutes a compensable taking when the particular intended
beneficiary of the action is the public as a whole.
A final case in this section, Westminster Investing Corp. v. G. C.
Murphy Co.,551 while not involving military action, involved destruction of
property during riots that followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., in April, 1968. Property owned by Westminister Investing
Corporation was destroyed.552 The company sued Murphy, which held a
lease on the property, and Murphy in turn impleaded the District of
Columbia, alleging it was liable for negligence and abandonment of duty in
failing to train its police properly in riot-control methods, and also in failing
to provide adequate protection during the riots.553 Liability was alleged to
be “based on the duty of the District of Columbia to protect life and
property during riots.”554
The court affirmed the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss
the complaints.555 The court stated that it is the “unvarying” rule that “in
the absence of legislation, municipalities and other governmental bodies are
not pecuniarily liable for destruction and injury [occasioned by] rioting
mobs.”556 “No reported case holds a governmental body liable in these circumstances, or indicates that there could be liability without a statute or
ordinance. All the statements by courts are the other way.”557 The court
noted the problems that might be occasioned even if municipal law
authorized the imposition of liability:
Shall responsibility be imposed without fault on the part of the
governmental entity or only if fault is proved, and if the latter what
extent of fault should be enough? If some sort of culpability is
made a prerequisite, should there be an exception for high-level
“discretionary” determinations? Or is it preferable, on the whole,
to adopt a scheme of participatory insurance? Shall there be
recovery for personal injury as well as for property loss? With
respect to property damages, what elements should be included—
merely the actual value of lost or destroyed physical property, or
also lost profits, or business opportunities, and other intangible
losses? Is there to be a top limit on awards, either a flat monetary
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.

434 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Westminster Investing, 434 F.2d at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 526.
Id at 523.
Id.
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sum or a percentage figure? Can adequate financial resources for
the payments be made available? Shall coverage be extended to
the victim alone or may his insurer stand in his shoes? Shall the
compensation plan be executed through an administrative
mechanism or shall the courts be used? 558
The court quoted Justice Harlan in the YMCA case:
[O]ur decision today does not in any way suggest that the victims
of civil disturbances are undeserving of relief. But it is for the
Congress (or other legislative body), not this Court, to decide the
extent to which those injured in the riot should be compensated,
regardless of the extent to which the police or military attempted to
protect the particular property which each individual owns.559
The Westminster case also involved a cause of action for “intentional
abandonment” of duties owed by the municipality to prevent and suppress
rioting.560 This cause of action alleged damages based on a
deliberate refusal to [deploy] available police [to] the claimant’s
[neighborhood,] the allocation of available police resources to
[other] areas[,] an administrative decision not to use police at a
certain location because of danger to them or the likelihood of
increasing or extending the violence[,] . . . and an administrative
determination that to permit the use of guns would result in too
many deaths or injuries to rioters.561
The court concluded, however, that the claim of “intentional abandonment”
was, as with the other causes of action sounding in negligence, not appropriate for the court to resolve without guidance or instruction from legislation on the subject.562
D. PUBLIC NECESSITY IN DESTROYING PROPERTY BY CIVIL
AUTHORITIES OR PRIVATE PARTIES
In this section, cases will be discussed in which individuals have
sought compensation for damage or destruction of private property justified
by public necessity. These are situations involving the police power exercised by the authorities or, in the absence of authorities, by private individuals. First, situations in which private property has been destroyed to
558. Id. at 523-24.
559. Id. at 525 (quoting Nat’l Bd. of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns v. United States, 395
U.S. 85, 96 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 526.
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prevent the spread of a fire that threatens a community will be considered.
Then other situations will be examined, such as the destruction of property
to avert a flood or to prevent the spread of disease. Finally, situations in
which private property has been damaged or destroyed by the police in the
course of apprehending criminal suspects will be analyzed.
As will be seen, courts have almost never granted claims for compensation in the proper exercise of police power:
[I]n its legitimate exercise the police power often works not only
damage to property, but destruction of property. Injury to property
can, and often does, result from the demolition of buildings to
prevent the spread of conflagration, from the abandonment of an
existing highway, from the enforced necessity of improving property in particular ways to conform to police regulations and
requirements. . . . And equally well settled and understood is the
law that in the exercise of this same power property may in some
and indeed in many instances be utterly destroyed. The destruction of buildings of diseased animals, of rotten fruit, of infected
trees, are cases that at once come to mind as applicable to both
personalty and realty.563
1.

Fire Cases

An area of public necessity involves fire emergencies. It is clearly the
right of the authorities as well as private individuals, when a fire threatens a
whole community, to destroy property of a few to prevent the fire from
spreading. To do otherwise is considered a “folly”:
We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3
Vol. of Clarendon’s History, where it is mentioned, that the Lord
Mayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on fire, would not
give directions for, or consent to, the pulling down forty wooden
houses, or to the removing the furniture, &c. [sic] belonging to the
Lawyers of the Temple, then on the Circuit, for fear he should be
answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half
that great city was burnt.564
In Surocco v. Geary,565 plaintiffs sued for damages for the “blowing up
with gunpowder, and [destruction of] their house and store, with goods

563. Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 163 P. 1024, 1031 (Cal. 1917).
564. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 363 (1788) (emphasis added).
565. 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
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therein[.]”566 The defense argued that to prevent the spread of the fire from
a public conflagration raging in the city of San Francisco, on Christmas
Eve, 1849, it was necessary to blow up and thereby destroy plaintiffs’
house.567 The evidence showed that the fire was very close to the site of
plaintiffs’ building and that its destruction was inevitable even if it had not
been blown up.568 The court reiterated the common law view that such
destruction, done for the public’s benefit, to prevent a fire from spreading
over the whole town, is justified, and there is no liability for
compensation.569
The right to destroy property, to prevent the spread of a
conflagration, has been traced to the highest law of necessity, and
the natural rights of man, independent of society or civil government. It is referred by moralists and jurists to the same great
principle which justifies the exclusive appropriation of a plank in a
shipwreck, though the life of another be sacrificed; with the
throwing overboard goods in a tempest, for the safety of a vessel;
with the trespassing upon the lands of another, to escape death by
an enemy. . . . A house on fire, or those in its immediate vicinity,
which serve to communicate the flames, becomes a nuisance,
which it is lawful to abate, and the private rights of the individual
yield to the considerations of general convenience, and the
interests of society. Were it otherwise, one stubborn person might
involve a whole city in ruin, by refusing to allow the destruction of
a building which would cut off the flames and check the progress
of the fire, and that, too, when it was perfectly evident that his
building must be consumed.570
Often enough, in cases of destruction of buildings based on public
necessity to prevent the spread of fire, the structures were likely to have
been destroyed anyway, but the necessitous action destroyed them sooner
than otherwise might have been the case.571 If the plaintiff can show that
the destruction would not otherwise have occurred, or that the necessity of
the destruction was not sufficiently imminent to justify the action taken, the
plaintiff might win damages.572

566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.

Surocco, 3 Cal. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id.

2007]

VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

721

For example, Bishop & Parsons v. Mayor of Macon 573 involved a fire
that broke out in the city of Macon, Georgia in August 1844.574 The Mayor
directed that plaintiff’s building be blown up in order to arrest the spread of
the fire.575 Plaintiff contended that this was done prematurely, and that
plaintiff was thereby prevented from removing numerous goods, wares and
merchandise from the building and saving them.576
To begin with, the court expressed the erroneous view that the
aggrieved party is entitled to compensation under the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment:
[I]t is now well settled, that in a case of actual necessity, to prevent
the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a
hostile army, or any other great public calamity, the private property of an individual may be lawfully taken, and used or destroyed
for the relief, protection or safety of the many. And in all such
cases—while the agents of the public who officiate are protected
from individual liability, the sufferers are nevertheless entitled,
under the Constitution, to just compensation from the public for
the loss.577
This portion of the opinion is flatly at odds with the general principles of
compensation that we discussed in Part B., that an aggrieved party is not
entitled to compensation for damages occasioned by acts of public
necessity.578
The court noted further that, where as a necessary result of the fire or
other public calamity the property would have been destroyed in any event,
the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation for blowing up the
building before the principal fire reached it.579 In this case, the fire would
have destroyed plaintiff’s building even if the actors had not ordered it
destroyed before the fire came upon that location.580 However, the plaintiff
sought to prove that the blowing up of the building was premature, that
plaintiff and his servants and friends, who had been removing various
goods from the building, were told to evacuate it because they were advised
the building was going to be blown up right away.581 However, in fact

573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.

7 Ga. 200, 1849 WL 1663 (1849).
Bishop, 1849 WL 1663, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
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there was about an hour to spare until the fire would have reached the
adjacent structure, so the plaintiff would have had sufficient time to remove
valuable goods from the premises.582 The imminence of the danger was
remote enough that the action could well have been deferred, at least for up
to an hour, and the plaintiff in turn could well have saved a significant
portion of the property within the structure that got destroyed.583
The court remanded the case for a new trial so that the jury could
consider the amount of damages for the loss of plaintiff’s goods, according
to proof.584 However, it appears clear that the plaintiff in this case would
not be entitled to compensation for loss of the structure itself since in any
case it would have been burned by the natural progression of the fire.585
In an unusual and bitterly contested fire case from England, a divided
appeals court in Cope v. Sharpe,586 reversed the trial court and ordered
judgment to be entered for the defendant based on the necessity doctrine.587
The plaintiff, the landowner, sued the defendant, who had hunting rights to
plaintiff’s property, alleging damages for trespass from a backfire that the
defendant’s gamekeeper started in April 1909.588 After a serious heath fire
had erupted on plaintiff’s property, about fifty men were engaged in trying
to stop it.589 The gamekeeper started a backfire some distance away in an
effort to prevent the main fire from spreading.590 Soon afterwards the main
fire was extinguished.591 Meanwhile, the backfire spread and caused
damages to the plaintiff’s lands.592
After three trials in which there were two mistrials, the jury returned a
verdict finding gamekeeper’s acts were not in fact necessary for the protection of the property.593 The jury determined that the fire would have been
extinguished, and in fact had been extinguished, without the aid of the
backfire which the defendant had created.594 Had the defendant not started
the backfire, the main fire would have been extinguished by the men who

582.
583.
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were dousing it and, in the end, the defendant’s backfire caused a net
increase in damage.595
The jury also found that the defendant’s acts, while not actually
necessary, were nonetheless reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as
suggested in the judge’s instructions.596 That is, the jury found that the
method adopted by the gamekeeper for the protection of the property was
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.597 Nonetheless, the trial
judge held that the method used by the defendant was not in fact necessary,
and ruled in favor of damages for the plaintiff.598
The appellate court considered what standard should be applied in
evaluating the defendant’s gamekeeper’s action in starting the backfire,
where, as it turned out, it was not in fact necessary to avert a greater
danger.599 The court held that the action in burning the backfire to prevent
a larger fire from spreading was justified because it appeared reasonably
necessary to protect the property from the threatened danger of the larger
fire, even though it was not in fact necessary to avert the danger, since the
main fire was soon afterwards extinguished.600
In the appellate decision, Lord Buckley stated:
[The jury] affirmed that there was a real and imminent danger
against which it was necessary to provide, and by the word
“reasonably” they affirmed that the acts which the defendant did
were acts reasonably done to meet that real and imminent
danger. . . . They found that the defendant’s acts were not in fact
(i.e., in the result), but were in reason, necessary.601
Lord Buckley disagreed on the trial judge’s standard and acknowledged that
if there was a real and imminent danger, the defendant was entitled to act,
and the test was “whether his acts were reasonably necessary in the sense of
acts which a reasonable man would properly do to meet a real danger.”602
In a separate concurring opinion, Lord Kennedy agreed with the
reasonableness standard in evaluating the actor’s appraisement of the
necessity to start the backfire:
[T]ake the case of the jettison of cargo at sea. Could it properly be
contended that the legal justification of the jettison depends upon
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
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proof that in fact, as things have happened, it was actually necessary for the safety of the adventure, and that a jettison made
reasonably in order to preserve the adventure from imminent peril
of destruction in a gale must be held to be unjustifiable, if the
owner of the goods jettisoned can prove that, after the jettison took
place, a sudden fall of the wind or a sudden change in its direction
removed the peril and that, therefore, the adventure would in fact
have been preserved without the jettison? In my humble judgment, this question ought to be answered in the negative. . . .603
Thus, the court held first that the necessity defense applies if the danger
to be averted exists in fact. Here, in fact, the heath fire was raging and
imperiled the surrounding lands—so that, in fact, there was an imminent
danger that required action.604 Second, the court held that the defendant’s
action in averting the greater evil was reasonably necessary, and that the
reasonableness of the action was sufficient to invoke the necessity doctrine,
even though, in fact, the action turned out to be unnecessary.
The court suggested in dictum that had the defendant been merely a
volunteer rather than a lessee, the court would “require very special
circumstances to justify, on the ground of reasonable necessity, his forcible
entry into the premises of another against the will of the owner, in order to
help in extinguishing a fire.”605 This portion of the opinion appears to be
unsound, and is not generally followed. As mentioned in the discussion of
public necessity in section III.A, private individuals as well as public
authorities are entitled to take reasonable action in the name of public
necessity,606 including tearing down or destroying buildings.607
2.

Cases Involving Floods, Infectious Disease, and a Mad Dog

In an 1881 case, Newcomb v. Tisdale,608 the Supreme Court of
California considered the necessity defense in diverting flood waters. The
defendants unlawfully cut a levee off the Sacramento River, causing water
to flood and “inundate the lands of plaintiffs, and destroy” growing crops of

603. Id. at 507-08 (Kennedy, L.J.). In maritime law, it is well settled that there is a privilege
to jettison cargo to save a vessel from destruction, and the loss is to be divided among the vessel
and cargo whose safety has been secured by the action. Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege
to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personalty, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307,
317 (1926).
604. Cope, 1 K.B. at 504.
605. Id. at 509.
606. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. e (2007).
607. See id. § 196 cmt. f.
608. 62 Cal. 575 (1881).
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grain.609 The plaintiffs sued for damages, and the defendants raised the
defense that the levee was cut in order to save life and property.610 The
evidence indicated that at times the river reached excessive height and
breaks over its banks, flooding property for miles in extent, endangering the
lives of the defendants and others.611
The defendants argued that the river became full to its utmost capacity
and that it was still rising, that natural outlets to ease the volume of water
were obstructed, and that its condition was an imminent threat to human
lives and property in the vicinity.612 The defendants, in order to prevent the
public calamity, proceeded to remove the obstructions, and in consequence
of their action, diverted the water, thereby causing other persons’ lands to
become flooded instead.613
The trial judge refused to let the jury consider this defense.614 On
review, it was held that “such necessity existed” and therefore the case
should have been submitted to the jury.615 The appellate court suggested
that if, on remand, the jury were to find that the action averted imminent
peril to lives as well as property, the defendant would not be liable to pay
compensation for damages. The majority decision seems consistent with
the view in section 196 of the Restatement that in situations of public
necessity, the aggrieved party may not be entitled to compensation for
damages.616
There was a dissent in Newcomb, in which the judge did not consider
this a situation where life was in peril.617 The defendants apparently had
the time and opportunity to cross a turbulent river in a great flood and take
the time to cut open the obstruction; they doubtless would have had time to
remove their families from the area before the lands got inundated.618 The
dissent suggested that this was not an instance in which the actors sought to
avert a greater evil, but rather a comparable evil was substituted for the one
averted.619 The flood waters were simply shifted from one group of
landowners to another group.620
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The Supreme Court case of Miller v. Schoene621 involved public
necessity in destroying trees to prevent the spread of an infectious plant
disease.622 The facts of the case were as follows: “[A] state entomologist[]
ordered the plaintiff[] to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar
trees growing on [plaintiff’s] property,” in order to prevent the trees from
spreading an infectious plant disease to the apple orchards within two miles
of the vicinity.623 The plant disease could be spread by spores from one
plant to the other over a radius of at least two miles.624 The value of red
cedar was small as compared with that of the apple orchards of Virginia.625
The damage to the plaintiff was about $5000 to $7000, while the damage to
the apple orchards in the vicinity would have been somewhat greater, especially in view of the importance of the apple industry to the state’s
economy. At the time of this case, apple growing was one of the principal
agricultural pursuits in Virginia. According to the law under which the
trees were ordered destroyed, the host trees of a communicable plant
disease were deemed a public nuisance, subject to destruction. The law
provided for procedures for a hearing on the determination of the state
entomologist, and appellate review. The Court stated:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. . . . When forced to
such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater
value to the public. It will not do to say that the case is merely one
of a conflict of two private interests and that the misfortune of
apple growers may not be shifted to cedar owners by ordering the
destruction of their property; for it is obvious that there may be,
and that here there is, a preponderant public concern in the
preservation of the one interest over the other.626
The Court added that Virginia did not have to compensate owners of
cedar trees destroyed to save apple trees because where the public interest is
concerned, it is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the police power
to prefer the public interest over the property interest of the individual, “to
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the extent even of its destruction.”627 According to the Court, the choice of
protecting the financial prosperity of the apple industry was motivated by
considerations of social policy, it was not unreasonable, or “unavoidable,”
and did not involve any denial of due process.628
In Seavy v. Preble,629 the Supreme Court of Maine considered what
precautions could be taken to prevent the spread of smallpox or other
contagious diseases. The plaintiff was a smallpox patient who sought
damages against the defendants for trespass and removal of wallpaper in his
home. The defendant was the city physician, and there were 107 cases of
smallpox in the city that winter. He and other physicians testified that it
was necessary “in order to cleanse a room in which small-pox patients have
been confined to remove the paper from the walls.”630 Doctors and nurses
testified that the wallpaper in the plaintiff’s room, particularly near his bed,
was soiled and that the patient must have spit a good deal and that his saliva
soiled the wallpaper.631 The best medical advice at the time suggested the
necessity of removing the paper and whitewashing the wall with quicklime.632 The city physician ordered this in the rooms of other smallpox
patients as well.633
The court stated that in order to prevent the spread of smallpox or other
contagious diseases,
persons may be seized and restrained of their liberty or ordered to
leave the state; private houses may be converted into hospitals and
made subject to hospital regulations; buildings may be broken
open and infected articles seized and destroyed, and many other
things done which under ordinary circumstances would be
considered a gross outrage upon the rights of persons and property.
This is allowed upon the same principle that houses are allowed to
be torn down to stop a conflagration. Salus populi suprema lex—
the safety of the people is the supreme law—is the governing
principle in such cases.634
The court added that in determining the extent of precautions to be taken,
“[i]n all cases of doubt the safest course should be pursued remembering
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that it is infinitely better to do too much than run the risk of doing too
little.”635
In Putnam v. Payne,636 the plaintiff brought an action for damages in
connection with the killing of his dog.637 The dog was very vicious and had
frequently attacked persons passing in the street.638 “The plaintiff below
had frequently been [apprised] of the ferocious acts of his dog, and had
been requested by [his] neighbors to kill or confine him. . . . The dog in
question had been bitten, a few days [earlier,] by a mad dog[,]” which
perhaps was rabid.639 Because of concerns in the village about mad dogs,
an ordinance provided for restraining dogs, and it was “lawful for any
person to kill any dog which should be found at large in the village.”640
The defendant, “in passing through the village, [saw] the plaintiff’s dog
running loose and shot him dead.”641 While the action was not taken by a
government official, it was authorized under the local ordinance, and the
court said that there would be no liability for damages.642
The court concluded that “the defendant was fully justified in killing
the dog under the circumstances, upon common law principles” of necessity.643 The dog was a dangerous and unruly animal, and yet his owner permitted him to run at large.644 The public safety demanded that something
be done.645 In addition, the dog had been bitten by a mad dog and may well
have had a contagious disease that would further jeopardize the citizens.646
3. Cases Involving Destruction or Harm to Property by Police in
Apprehending Criminal Suspects
Numerous state courts have refused to grant compensation when private property is damaged or destroyed as a result of police action in the
course of apprehending criminal suspects.647 The reasoning is that the
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647. See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 923 (Cal. 1995), cert.
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Bray v. Houston County, 348 S.E.2d 709, 710-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); McCoy v. Sanders, 148
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damage is not a taking, but rather a tort, and in turn the aggrieved party
frequently cannot recover under a tort claim unless there is evidence of
unreasonable governmental activity.648 Essentially, the courts find a
“public necessity” exception to justify non-compensation,649 a position that,
as mentioned in Section III.B., is affirmed by the Restatement.
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento,650 involved the police’s use of
tear gas to apprehend a criminal who had taken refuge in a liquor store. The
owner of a convenience store sued under the state constitution’s “Just
Compensation” clause to recover damage to his store and its contents
caused when police acted to apprehend a suspect who had taken refuge in
the building.651 The damage occurred when police launched twelve or thirteen tear gas canisters into the building, causing property damage in excess
of $275,000, which included “nearly $90,000 in contaminated inventory,
approximately $150,000 to dispose of this hazardous waste, and over
$18,000 to repair the building and fixtures.”652 The California Supreme
Court held, over a vigorous dissent, that the property of the store owner was
not taken for a “public use,” but that the use benefited a particular
individual.653
The court stated that “law enforcement officers must be permitted to
respond to emergency situations that endanger public safety, unhampered
by the specter of constitutionally mandated liability for [the] resulting
damage to private property and by the ensuring potential for disciplinary
action.”654 The court further stated that “it is a specific application of the
general rule that damage to, or even destruction of, property pursuant to a
valid exercise of the police power often requires no compensation under the
just compensation clause.”655 According to the court, the plaintiff might
have a remedy under the state’s Tort Claims Act, if negligence could be
proven and certain immunity provisions did not apply to the police conduct,
but not under the state’s “Just Compensation” clause.656
App. 1984); Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 42 N.E.2d 158, 160 (Ohio 1942); Sullivant v. City of
Oklahoma City, 940 P.2d 220, 227 (Okla. 1997).
648. See, e.g., Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 901; Ind. State Police, 469 N.E.2d at 1184;
Sullivant, 940 P.2d at 223.
649. See generally, Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 SW. U.
L. REV. 627, 653-57 (1988) (discussing cases where the Supreme Court found actions justified by
emergency situations).
650. 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1116 (1996).
651. Customer Co., 895 P.2d at 901-04.
652. Id. at 904.
653. Id. at 923.
654. Id. at 910-11.
655. Id. at 909.
656. Id. at 915.
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Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.657 involved a similar situation.658
A fleeing suspect took refuge in the plaintiff’s residence.659 Police surrounded the house and, when the suspect ignored orders to surrender, fired
tear gas and “flash-bang” grenades into the house.660 As a result, they
captured the suspect, but caused damage to the plaintiff’s home in the
amount of $71,000.661
The Minnesota court seemed motivated by a sense of fundamental
fairness, in refusing to allow the city to defend the claim based on public
necessity:
We believe the better rule, in situations where an innocent third
party’s property is taken, damaged or destroyed by the police in
the course of apprehending a suspect, is for the municipality to
compensate the innocent party for the resulting damages. . . . At
its most basic level, the issue is whether it is fair to allocate the
entire risk of loss to an innocent homeowner for the good of the
public. We do not believe the imposition of such a burden on the
innocent citizens of this state would square with the underlying
principles of our system of justice.662
Wallace v. City of Atlantic City663 involved damage to apartment doors
caused by a police drug raid. The court held that the government should
bear the costs because the damage was incurred for the benefit of the
public.664 The court relied on the “intended beneficiary” test of the YMCA
case, which was discussed in Section III.C., noting that in this case the
“particular intended beneficiary was the public, rather than a private
individual, [thus] compensation [is] warranted.”665
In Steele v. City of Houston,666 escaped prisoners took refuge in plaintiff’s house.667 In order to capture the escapees, police set fire to the house,
destroying it and its contents. The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the
residence was taken “for the public use . . . by proof that the City ordered
the destruction of the property because of real or supposed public

657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.

479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
Wegner, 479 N.W.2d at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
608 A.2d 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992).
Wallace, 608 A.2d at 484.
Id. at 483.
603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980).
Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 789.
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emergency to apprehend armed and dangerous men who had taken refuge in
the house.”668 Here the court seemed to take on the YMCA “intended
beneficiary” approach by suggesting the police action was for the safety of
the public rather than for a private individual.
The court also recognized the traditional emergency exception to
claims for just compensation by stating: “The defendant City of Houston
may defend its actions by proof of a great public necessity. Mere convenience will not suffice.”669 The court then seemed to ignore this comment in saying, in the next paragraph, that the property owner was entitled
to compensation, without a determination whether the police were
responding to an emergency: “We do not hold that the police officers
wrongfully ordered the destruction of the dwelling; we hold that the innocent third parties are entitled by the [Texas] Constitution to compensation
for their property[,]”670 and judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
The Wegner, Wallace and Steele opinions do not represent the weight
of authority. Almost every other court that has considered the question has
denied compensation for damages caused by reasonable police conduct in
apprehending criminal suspects.
In Blackman v. City of Cincinnati,671 the owner of an automobile sued
to recover damages resulting when a police officer entered plaintiff’s automobile and ordered him to pursue a vehicle containing fleeing suspect.672
Plaintiff’s car was damaged during the chase when it collided with parked
truck. The Ohio Supreme Court denied a claim for compensation under the
“Takings Clause” of the Ohio Constitution, saying that this provision was
not intended to apply to personal property such as an automobile.673
In Indiana State Police v. May,674 police fired tear gas into the
plaintiff’s home to capture a felony suspect who had taken refuge there, and
compensation for the damages was denied.
In McCoy v. Sanders,675 a landowner sued under the “Takings Clause”
of the Georgia Constitution for damages that resulted when police drained
his pond (killing all the fish, and damaging the pond) to search for a murder
victim.676 The court stated that “[u]nder certain circumstances and

668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.

Id. at 792.
Id.
Id. at 793.
42 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio 1942).
Blackman, 42 N.E.2d at 159.
Id. at 160.
469 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind. 1994).
148 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
See McCoy, 148 S.E.2d at 903.
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conditions, a municipality may, acting under its police power for the
general welfare of the public, take or use the property of a person or
corporation without paying compensation therefor.”677
And, in Patel v. United States,678 the court denied compensation when
police, in executing an arrest warrant, fired smoke grenades, tear gas and
flash grenades into plaintiff’s residence, causing fire that destroyed
residence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have been vigilant in upholding the privilege of necessity, both
public and private, in connection with the invasion of property rights in
order to avert a greater evil. However, the question of compensation has
been somewhat case-specific. Many of the results seem intuitive, while
others seem unfair.
In cases of private necessity, there is a kind of anomaly in the law:
agents can be obligated to pay compensation to those who suffer loss at
their hands even though it was permissible to have caused that loss. This
anomaly seems based on the intuitive sense that as between the individuals
concerned, it is fair that the one whose interests are advanced by the act
should bear the cost of harm done in the process, rather than imposing the
loss on one who derives no benefit from the act. This principle has been
criticized. Phillip Montague, for example, argues that only a wrongful act
can give rise to a duty to compensate, so one who is driven by necessity to
harm another’s property ought not owe compensation.679
When an act of private necessity is non-negligent and involuntary, as in
some of the aircraft emergency landing situations examined in this article,
the injured party is not entitled to compensation. This result has been criticized, for “[t]he person who finds her body or property damaged will find it
little consolation that her injurer acted without fault. (In fact, she will in a
pragmatic sense find in that situation a greater wrong to herself, since our
present tort system will allow her no compensation at all.)”680
The infringement of property rights in situations of public necessity
does not carry with it an obligation to pay compensation, even though often
enough the material harm is greater than with acts of private necessity (e.g.,
blowing up a bridge to prevent enemy troops from gaining an advantage, or
677. Id. at 904.
678. 823 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
679. See Phillip Montague, Rights and Duties of Compensation, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS
79, 84 (1984).
680. Howard Klepper, Torts of Necessity: A Moral Theory of Compensation, 9 LAW & PHIL.
223, 226 (1990).
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burning down a house to flesh out a criminal suspect). In both instances the
doctrine of necessity justifies the action. However, in the case of public
necessity the explanation for not requiring compensation appears to rest on
the idea that the actor who performs an act of public necessity thereby
averts a public calamity; the actor as such gains no personal advantage from
the situation, but the public at large does, while in situations of private
necessity the actor or some other individual has benefited, not the public at
large. Thus, it would be unfair to impose a duty of compensation on one
who acts to avert a public disaster.
To the extent an aggrieved party is not legally entitled to compensation
for the material harm resulting due to public necessity, there is nonetheless
a moral obligation to provide compensation, either through ad hoc statutory
enactments, or by broad statutory schemes. As President Grant stated in his
veto message, mentioned in Part III.C, “[i]f a government makes compensation under such circumstances, it is a matter of bounty rather than of strict
legal right.”681 In those situations of public necessity where compensation
has in fact been awarded, as where the property was taken by the military
for later use, or where there has been unnecessary destruction of property,
courts have been careful to note that the theory of compensation is based on
implied promise in contract law, rather than on the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
Just what constitutes a necessitous circumstance and a reasonable
choice between two evils is something that varies from time and place, and
juries are entitled to assess the necessity doctrine according to evolving
standards. In this regard, George Washington once wrote: “[W]hat is sometimes good may at other times be evil, and what is sometimes wrong may
sometimes be right when it serves a good enough end—depending on the
situation.682

681. United States v. Pac. R R. Co., 120 U.S. 227, 238 (1887) (CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 2d
Sess. 4155 (1872) (veto message of President Ulysses S. Grant)).
682. JOSEPH FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS 123 (1966).

